


Gender, Governance, and Corruption

Examining the Relationship between
Corruption, Gender, and Parliamentary
Representation in Afghanistan



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About EPD

EQUALITY for Peace and Democracy (EPD) is a nonprofit, non-governmental organization dedicated to empowering women and youth at the community and policy levels in Afghanistan. EPD was established in early 2010 by Ms. Nargis Nehan. EPD works to build the capacity of women and youth in order for them to articulate their needs in the development, peacebuilding and democratic processes. EPD further aims to mobilize women and youth to contribute to overcoming the challenges of instability that Afghanistan is facing.

EPD has established platforms for women and youth to come together, establish networks, build trust and confidence, and strive jointly toward transforming Afghanistan into a democratic country free of all forms of violence and discrimination. EPD's Afghans' Coalition for Transparency and Accountability community-led networks monitor service delivery, advocate for good governance and are based in Herat, Bamyan, Nangarhar and Kabul. EPD's Provincial Women's Network community-led networks identify and address issues that are of concern to women in the community and are based in Herat, Bamyan, Nangarhar, Faryab, Kunduz, Kandahar and Kabul.

Furthermore, EPD is one of the lead civil society organizations in Kabul building alliances with other civil society organizations and groups, monitoring government policy-making in the areas of peace and good governance, ensuring human rights and advocating for engagement of civil society. EPD's team, beside traveling around the country and interacting with people to understand their concerns, is also organizing meetings and debates at the center of policy-making to voice people's concerns. EPD's leadership is attending international events and advocating for effective and sustainable engagement of the international community in Afghanistan.

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Acronyms

AFN	Afghani (currency)
DAO	Differential Association and Opportunity theory
DUREL	Duke University Religion Index
EVAW	Elimination of Violence Against Women
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
MP	Member of Parliament
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SDO	Social Dominance Orientation
SIGI	Social Institutions and Gender Index
SNTV	Single Non-Transferable Vote

Executive Summary

There is considerable research demonstrating a significant negative relationship between the representation of women in legislature and a country's level of corruption. Based on existing research on gender behavioral differences, Dollar, Fisman and Gotti hypothesized that greater levels of representation of women in parliament would correspond to lower levels of corruption, measured according to the International Country Risk Guide's corruption index. The study found that even after controlling for GDP, civil liberties, population, average years of schooling, openness to trade, and ethnic fractionalization of a country, at the country level, higher rates of female participation in government are associated with lower levels of corruption.¹

However, though Afghanistan ranks 36th in the world in terms of women in legislature, it is also among the most corrupt countries in the world according to international rankings. The early Dollar et al. research was followed by over a decade of additional studies on this relationship, which essentially advances four categories of explanations for this observed relationship between corruption and gender—behavioral differences, gendered networks, liberal democracy, and social institutions. This research seeks to answer the question of why the relationship between women in legislature and corruption, which has been shown to be consistent cross-nationally and in a range of contexts, appears nonexistent in Afghanistan. It examines the four key categories of explanations for this relationship based on over a decade of research on the subject in a variety of contexts. Research has attributed the correlation between corruption and gender to behavioral differences between men and women. Others have asserted that women are for the most part relatively new to politics, and have less access to networks that provide opportunities for corrupt behavior. An alternative explanation is the 'fairer sex' versus 'fairer system' theory, which asserts that an association between gender and corruption is spurious and mainly caused by its context—liberal democracy, which in theory would promote both gender equality and better governance. Lastly, other research has posited that corruption is higher in countries where social institutions deprive women of their freedom to participate in social life. These findings would suggest that, in a context where social values disadvantage women, neither political reforms towards democracy nor increasing the representation of women in political and economic

positions might be enough to reduce corruption.

In this research, a survey was completed with 105 Afghan Members of Parliament (MPs), representative of the 249-member Wolesi Jirga at a 90% confidence level and 6.12% margin of error. The distribution of male and female survey respondents closely mirrors the makeup of the Wolesi Jirga; whereas 28% of MPs in the Wolesi Jirga are female, 31% of survey respondents for this research were female MPs.

Key Findings

Gender and Corruption

In this research, there were no significant differences between male and female MPs on any of the items related to beliefs about and exposure to corruption. 51% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that many other male MPs are corrupt while 49% felt the same regarding female MPs. The research found that both male and female MPs largely self-report that they disapprove of corruption, with only 2% of respondents agreeing that under certain circumstances, it is sometimes okay to take a bribe. However, MPs largely felt that corruption is a large part of success in government or politics in Afghanistan, and that it is normal for MPs to use their position to do favors for people. All MPs, regardless of gender, also reported high levels of exposure to corruption. Many reported that people often approach them to ask for favors and that people do favors for them or members of their family. However, fewer reported that people often approach them to offer bribes or compensation for favors.

Behavioral Differences and Personality Traits

Past research has suggested that impulsive individuals may be less ethical than those who are non-impulsive, and individuals who think carefully before acting are more likely to act ethically.² As hypothesized, the findings from the present study suggest that higher levels of impulsivity are related to exposure to and engagement in corruption. However, the relationship between confidence and corruption was unclear, with one relationship suggesting that higher levels of confidence were related to lower levels of corruption, and three relationships suggesting that

1 David Dollar, Raymond Fisman, and Roberta Gatti, "Are Women Really the 'Fairer' Sex? Corruption and Women in Government," The World Bank Development Research Group, Policy Research Report on Gender and Development, Working Paper Series, No. 4, October 1999.

2 Bratton and Strittmatter, "To Cheat or Not to Cheat?: The Role of Personality in Academic and Business Ethics," 2013.

higher levels of confidence were related to higher levels of corruption. Based on the literature review stating that less confident individuals may feel coerced by their peers into committing acts of corruption, the authors expected the relationship to be that respondents who scored lower on confidence would score higher on corruption. The significant items that demonstrated high levels of confidence had to do with being good at their job, feeling they are a respected member in their field, and feeling confident about their abilities. The significant items that demonstrated corruption had to do with how others interact with the MP, including being approached for favors and having others do favors for the respondent or their family. A possible explanation is that the relationship has more to do with how others view and interact with MPs as a result of their level of confidence as opposed to how much they engage in corrupt behavior.

The one relationship found for risk aversion suggested that higher levels of risk aversion were related to higher levels of corruption, which was in the opposite direction of the hypothesized relationship that higher levels of risk aversion would be related to lower levels of corruption. The risk aversion item was related to going out of one's way to avoid conflict, so it is possible that this item was capturing conflict aversion as opposed to risk aversion. As such, an individual may engage in corrupt behavior (e.g. give in to pressure to take a bribe) out of a desire to avoid conflict. The results also showed that lower levels of selfishness were related to lower levels of corruption. This finding was in line with the hypothesized relationship that individuals who score higher on selfishness will score higher on corruption.

The relationship between nurturing and corruption was unclear because two relationships showed that higher levels of nurturing were associated with lower levels of corruption, as hypothesized; however, three relationships suggested that higher levels of nurturing were related to higher levels of corruption. The later relationships were between being available to spend time with immediate family (higher level of nurturing) and corruption items examining favors that the respondent does for others, that others do for them, and the belief that it is normal for MPs to use their position to do favors. It is possible that being available to spend time with immediate family translates to being available to support other members of the community, and the parliamentary position makes it possible for a nurturing MP to support and nurture the community. The relationship between materialism and corruption showed that higher levels of materialism were related to higher levels of corruption. This is the relationship that was hypothesized.

Findings for honesty were not as hypothesized. Prior to the study, authors predicted that higher levels of honesty would

be related to lower levels of corruption. However, the study findings showed the opposite—that higher levels of honesty were related to higher levels of corruption. A possible explanation for this could be the individual respondent's level of honesty while being surveyed. Individuals who are highly honest would be more likely to admit to the items that were designed to measure corruption. An individual who is less honest may be less likely to be forthcoming on items measuring a negative construct such as corruption. As such, they may be more likely to answer dishonestly in an attempt to make themselves look better on a survey and therefore skew the data to appear less corrupt.

Contrary to the hypothesis, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) appears to have no relationship to beliefs about or exposure to corruption, and there were no gender differences in SDO between the male and female MPs in this study. Religiousness was associated with some items related to corruption, where more religious respondents also had higher beliefs in and exposure to corruption. Additionally, while it was observed, as hypothesized, that more conservative beliefs are related to more corrupt beliefs and behaviors in some aspects, this study found no difference between male and female MPs regarding conservative versus progressive beliefs, even on items related to gender equality.

Gender differences emerged on single variables measuring confidence, honesty, and materialism, with females demonstrating higher levels of confidence and honesty than males, and males demonstrating higher levels of materialism than females, on average. No gender differences were indicated for impulsivity, risk aversion, selfishness, or nurturing. However, based on the fact that significant differences were found on only four out of 35 items representing three personality traits, and no gender differences were observed regarding SDO, the authors conclude that there is little difference in personality in relation to corruption between males and females.

Gendered Networks

This research found some tenuous evidence that male MPs have more access to networks that would facilitate opportunities for corruption than female MPs. Their families are more politically active; they feel that they are better at conducting business; they are significantly more likely to socialize with other male MPs; and they were more likely to say that they knew powerful and important people before becoming an MP. However, in the majority of the variables related to family and business networks, parliamentary networks, political networks, pre-parliamentary networks, and political parties, this research found little evidence that male and female MPs have differing access to networks that

could facilitate opportunities for corruption. Nonetheless, this research did find access to networks to be related to exposure to and beliefs about corruption. However, on many items, both male and female MPs demonstrated considerable access to networks.

Liberal Democracy

Research has posited that a liberal democratic polity facilitates a more participatory social structure and encourages lower levels of corruption, and therefore that democratic governance systems facilitate a stigmatization of corruption. Positively, Afghanistan ranks 42nd out of 143 countries in the Inter-Parliamentary Union database in terms of percentage of women in parliament, with 27.7% women in the lower house and 17.6% in the upper house. Afghanistan ranks 70th out of 94 countries in terms of proportion of women among ministerial positions, with 10% of ministerial positions held by women. However, according to various international indices, Afghanistan generally scores poorly in terms of rule of law, freedom of press, and democratic elections. The judicial system is relatively weak and marked by corruption as well as widespread violations of women's rights. The media is under constant threat, elections continue to be marked by corruption and fraud, and violence and instability continue to negatively impact political activity. Afghanistan is also lacking in terms of socioeconomic development, with high levels of poverty and illiteracy. Corruption is largely normalized within Afghan political institutions, with individual experiences of corruption widespread, the most common of which is perceived by Afghans to be ethnic, personal, family, and party relations. What's more, perceptions surveys and international indices find that the Parliament is widely perceived to be corrupt.

Social Institutions

Research has postulated that the role of social institutions actually underlies the observed relationship found between gender and corruption in other research. Through this lens, it is asserted that underlying cultural shifts linked to economic development contribute to self-expression values that facilitate democratic institutions and higher levels of women in parliament. International indices rank Afghanistan as high in terms of discrimination and social institutions in relation to gender inequality, with a discriminatory family code, restricted physical integrity, son bias, limited resources and assets, and restricted civil liberties for women. Women continue to have relatively limited access to public spaces and there are continuous threats against those who are active in the public sphere. Public attitudes toward women in politics are also mixed. There are still considerable levels of public sentiment that women should not be allowed to work outside the home, and that elected government

positions should be mostly for men.

Conclusions

This research found no evidence to support arguments that male or female MPs in Afghanistan are more or less corrupt. Though gender differences in personality traits were expected to be a major finding in this study, relatively few gender differences emerged. This challenges the idea that gender differences in personality traits contribute to engagement in and exposure to corruption in Afghanistan, and suggests that it is not likely that female MPs in Afghanistan are inherently less corrupt or have intrinsic personality traits that make them less likely to support or engage in corruption. This research also found that there appears to be little to no difference between male and female MPs regarding access to networks that would facilitate opportunities for corruption. Additionally, contrary to the findings of other research, this research found no difference between male and female MPs regarding their involvement in political parties, likely due to the weak nature of the party system in Afghanistan.

Based on the findings of this research, the authors conclude that the high level of corruption in Afghanistan despite the relatively high level of representation of women in parliament can likely be attributed to the general pervasive nature of corruption in Afghanistan, as well as weak rule of law and media, and a lack of strong social institutions that would both stigmatize corruption and promote gender equality. According to the findings of this research, it seems that all MPs in Afghanistan are generally well connected, have powerful supporters, and are exposed to opportunities for corruption. Looked at through this lens, perhaps most convincingly, the findings of this research would seem to fall in line with the hypothesis from existing research advanced by Alhassan-Aloho, which draws upon Differential Association and Opportunity theory (DAO) and Social Role theory in advancing that women will not be less corrupt if opportunities corruption and corrupt networks exist. This framework advances that corruption does not depend on gender, but rather is related to opportunities and networks for corruption, which can be gendered or gender neutral, the latter of which appears to be the case in Afghanistan. In a context where opportunities and networks are gender neutral, which this study found Afghanistan to be, the gender of the official would not make any difference regarding corruption, supporting the findings of this research.

This evidence would support the hypotheses advanced in existing research that in countries where social institutions inhibit women's freedom to participate in social life, corruption is higher. Though the high percentage of women in parliament in Afghanistan would appear to indicate a

degree of gender equality and support for women in public life, this is not necessarily matched by social institutions that promote gender equality or widespread social attitudes that support women in politics and public life. The quota system in Afghanistan creates an illusion of women's participation in government that does not necessarily reflect underlying shifts in cultural heritage and economic development that contribute to strong social institutions. Ultimately, this research concludes that the lack of relationship between gender and corruption in Afghanistan can be explained by: (1) the widespread pervasiveness and normalization of corruption, and the gender neutral nature of corrupt opportunities and networks; and (2) by Afghanistan lacking strong institutions—particularly rule of law and a free press. In the absence of strong social institutions, women's participation in government in Afghanistan is not a reflection of true gender equal values in society, which have been found to correspond to liberal democracy and more developed social institutions that support women's participation as well as discouraging corruption.

1. Introduction

There is a significant amount of research in the past two decades demonstrating a significant negative relationship between the representation of women in legislature and a country's level of corruption, where for the purposes of this research corruption is defined as misuse of public power for private benefit.³ With the litany of support for women's presence in the legislature and lower levels of corruption, there has been a significant push for strategies to encourage increased election of female representatives in the international community, such as quota systems like that implemented in Afghanistan. However, in Afghanistan, this relationship does not appear to hold true. Afghanistan ranks 36th in the world in terms of women in legislature, but is among the most corrupt countries in the world according to international rankings.

More than a decade of research on gender and corruption precedes this research, with a number of impassioned explanations for the link, which in itself has been the source of contention. Particularly, a 2001 World Bank resource called 'Engendering Development' came under wide criticism for asserting that having more women in politics and the labor force could be an effective force for good governance and business trust, based on earlier research from Kaufman in 1998 and the Dollar et al. and Swamy et al. studies.⁴ Largely, the negative response to this assertion was based on the claim that the studies were far from conclusive, and the causal relationship and nuances of the relationship between gender and corruption were unclear at best, and should not be a source for advancing a policy agenda of women as a tool to fight corruption in itself.⁵ Still today, there remains little consensus on the explanation for the relationship. Following this early research, there have been a number of explanations for why women's participation is related to lower levels of corruption, which can be summarized into the following categories:

- Behavioral Differences
 - Research has attributed this correlation to behavioral differences between men and women—namely, that women are: less selfish, more likely to exhibit 'helping' behavior and to support social issues, more honest, more risk averse, have more self-control, more

cooperative, less competitive, more relationship-oriented, more compliant, and most importantly, less likely to engage in corrupt activities (much of the research focuses on participation in bribery).

- Gendered Networks
 - Some research asserts an explanation that many deem contradictory to the behavioral differences explanation—that women are for the most part relatively new to politics, and have less access to networks that provide opportunities for corrupt behavior. The conceptual framework for understanding gendered networks and politics presents a two-dimensional process: one that functions during candidate recruitment and one that functions during the representation on elected seats.
- Liberal Democracy
 - An alternative explanation is the 'fairer sex' versus 'fairer system' theory, which asserts that an association between gender and corruption is spurious and mainly caused by its context—liberal democracy—which in theory would promote gender equality and better governance.
- Social Institutions
 - The last main category of explanation is social institutions. According to this research, corruption is higher in countries where social institutions deprive women of their freedom to participate in social life. These findings would suggest that, in a context where social values disadvantage women, neither political reforms towards democracy nor increasing the representation of women in political and economic positions might be enough to reduce corruption.

Given these well-established connections, why does the relationship between women in legislature and corruption, which has been shown to be consistent cross-nationally and in a range of contexts, appear nonexistent in Afghanistan? What has the quota system for female participation done for corruption in Afghanistan? Perhaps relationships do exist between female participation in the legislature and corruption in Afghanistan, but the level of corruption is so high that the effect is difficult to discern. Or, if relationships do not exist, why? Identifying the contextual specifications that make Afghanistan's situation exceptional could be helpful in identifying necessary reforms to maximize the benefits of female participation and create a more enabling environment for female participation in politics in Afghanistan. This research aims to answer the above

3 Brian S. Connelly and DS Ones, "The Personality of Corruption: A National-Level Analysis," *Cross-Cultural Research* 42, no. 4 (2008): 353-385.

4 Elizabeth M. King and Andrew D. Mason, "Engendering Development," *The World Bank*, 2001, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PGLP/Resources/Engendering_Development.pdf.

5 See Alhassan-Aloho (2007) and Goetz (2007)

questions and to examine the relationship between gender and corruption specific to the context of Afghanistan.

1.1 Structure of the Report

The introduction to this report has served to outline the research framework, methods and methodology, and limitations of the research. Chapter 2 provides background and context for the research, outlining Afghanistan's legal and electoral framework, women's political representation in Afghanistan, corruption in Afghanistan, and addressing the role and effectiveness of quota systems in advancing women's political representation, particularly as it relates to the framework of the research linking women's participation to lower levels of corruption. Chapter 3 presents the findings of this research. This chapter takes a unique approach, presenting a literature review of existing research regarding the various explanations for the relationship between gender and corruption in tandem with the findings of this research. The literature in each section seeks to present the theoretical underpinning informing the hypothesis this research aimed to test, followed by the findings of the survey contextualizing the hypothesis to the Afghan context and elucidating whether the arguments advanced by existing research are supported or contradicted by the findings of this research. Chapter 4 presents the conclusion of the research, examining which theories from existing research held true in the research and advancing conclusions and hypothesis based on our findings specific to the Afghan context.

1.2 Methods

In this research, a survey was completed with 105 MPs—72 men and 33 women. This is representative of the 249-member Wolesi Jirga at a 90% confidence level and 6.12% margin of error. The distribution of male and female survey respondents closely mirrors the makeup of the Wolesi Jirga; whereas 28% of MPs in the Wolesi Jirga are female, 31% of survey respondents for this research were female MPs.

1.2a Survey

The survey consisted of four sections designed to address various explanations for gendered differences in corrupt behaviors, as well as an addition section containing demographic items. All items in sections A through D were structured as statements, with response options on a 7-point Likert scale from strongly agree (1) to strongly

disagree (7).

Section A of the survey consisted of two sections. The first consisted of six items measuring respondents' degree of religiosity, derived and adapted from existing surveys including the Duke University Religion Index (DUREL)⁶ and a survey developed by the Pew Research Center for measuring perceptions regarding politics and religion in Iran.⁷ The second section consisted of six items measuring progressiveness/conservatism. These items were developed specifically based on the Afghan context, and items addressed issues such as the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law, human rights, diversity of values, and shelters for abused women in Afghanistan.

Section B of the survey consisted of 35 questions to measure personality characteristics hypothesized to be related to engagement in corruption, including impulsivity, confidence, risk aversion, selfishness, nurturing, materialism, and honesty. These survey items were taken from existing psychological surveys, adapted for context as necessary. The five items examining impulsivity were adapted from the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale,⁸ which was chosen because it is regarded as the most commonly used impulsivity questionnaire and demonstrates good psychometric properties. This scale measures impulsivity using 30 statements describing ways of thinking and acting, answered on a four-point Likert-type scale.^{9 10} The five items measuring confidence were adapted from the Revised Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy scale,¹¹ which is also shown to have good psychometric properties and is considered a good scale for use with adults. This 23-item scale measures self-regard, academic abilities, social confidence, and appearance. The five items measuring risk aversion were adapted from the Risk Motivation Questionnaire, also chosen for its good psychometric properties.¹² This measure has respondents elaborate on their motivations for engaging in risky activities. No literature could be found detailing existing measures examining selfishness or honesty, therefore the authors created five items to measure each of these constructs with consideration to local context and culture. The five items examining nurturing were adapted from The Nurturant Fathering Scale, selected for its excellent

6 Harold G. Koenig and Arndt Bussing, "The Duke University Religion Index (DUREL): A Five-Item Measure for Use in Epidemiological Studies," *Religions* 1 (2010): 78-85.

7 "Iranians' Views Mixed on Political Role for Religious Figures," Pew Research Center, 11 June 2013, <http://www.pewforum.org/2013/06/11/iranians-views-mixed-on-political-role-for-religious-figures/>.

8 Patton, J. H., Stanford, M. S., & Barratt, E. S. (1995). Factor structure of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. *Journal Of Clinical Psychology*, 51(6), 768-774.

9 Baumann, A. A., & Odum, A. L. (2012). Impulsivity, risk taking, and timing. *Behavioural Processes*, 90(3), 408-414.

10 Haden, S. C. & Shiva, A. (2008). Trait impulsivity in a forensic patient sample: An evaluation of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. *Behavioral Sciences & the Law*, 26, 675-690.

11 Heatherton, T. F. & Wyland, C. L. (2003). Assessing Self-Esteem.

12 Rohrmann, Bernd. (2005). Risk attitude scales: Concepts, questionnaires, utilizations.

psychometric properties.¹³ This scale is used to characterize the relationship between children and their fathers. The five items measuring materialism were adapted from The Materialism Scale.¹⁴ This scale uses 16 items to examine the extent to which an individual values material possessions, and it was chosen for its demonstrated validity.

Section C of the survey consisted of 14 items measuring Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), taken from the scale developed by Filicia Pratto, James Sidanius, Lisa M. Stallworth, and Bertram F. Malle in 1994. The scale is designed to measure the extent to which one desires that one's in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups, and whether one generally prefers intergroup relations to be equal versus hierarchical. The construct was developed through testing over 70 items related to SDO, which was then utilized with 1,952 college student subjects and was found to measure a unitary construct.¹⁵

Section D consisted of 41 items covering a wide range of variables related to gendered networks and directly regarding perceptions and experiences of corruption. This section addressed participants' extra-parliamentary networks, parliamentary networks, powerful associations prior to becoming an MP and family position, exposure to corruption, and beliefs about corruption. It also addressed MP's interactions with other individuals such as ministers, other MPs, party officials, constituents, business officials, and the President of Afghanistan.

Section E consisted of 10 demographic items including age, gender, marital status, monthly household income, household size, level of education, ethnicity, length of time as a parliamentarian, length of career in politics, and the participant's job prior to becoming an MP.

1.2b Process

Participants were first provided with a brief description of the research and the survey. Participants were informed of what the experiment involved (survey length, approximate time commitment), made aware of their rights and of potential risks, and measures taken to ensure confidentiality. This was followed by a signed consent form, without which participants were not surveyed.

Participants were then given the survey to self-administer. In cases where the participant was unable to complete the

survey themselves it was administered verbally by a trained data collector. After completing the survey, participants were provided with a debrief form. In the debrief form, participants were told what the experiment was about and how their participation would be used. Participants were given the opportunity to ask questions, and contact information of the researcher in case they wanted further information or felt that their rights had been violated.

Participants had the right to confidentiality and data collectors took every precaution to uphold this right. No identifying information was collected in the surveys, where participants were assigned identification numbers (men: 1XX, women: 2XX), and the database and any records connecting the name and ID were stored separately from the paper surveys and digital records. Surveyors were instructed to not discuss experiences with MPs with anyone outside of the research team, and only experiences that were necessary to the study were discussed within the research team.

1.2c Sample

Participants were selected using a snowball sample, a non-probability sampling technique where existing study participants recruit future study participants from among their acquaintances. The sample was limited to the elected Wolesi Jirga, and no MPs from the appointed Meshrano Jirga were interviewed. MPs who were seen as likely to support and participate in the research were approached first, who then referred the data collectors to other MPs to participate in the survey.

1.3 MP Demographics

The youngest MP surveyed was 30 years old, where the oldest self-reported age was 80, and the average age of MPs surveyed was 48. 21% of MPs surveyed fell in the age range of 30-39 years of age; 33% 40-49; 33% 50-59; 13% 60 and older. 34% of MPs surveyed identified as Pashtun, 18% Tajik, 17% Hazara, 7% Uzbek, 6% as Afghan, 5% Aimak, 3% Turkmen, and 5% as other ethnicities, with 6% declining to disclose their ethnicity. 95% of MPs surveyed are married.

1% of respondents reported that they completed primary school; 2% completed secondary school; 10% completed high school; 7% reported that they hold an associate's degree, 53% a Bachelor's degree, and 24% a Master's degree or above, with 2% refusing to disclose their education status. Level of education was inversely related to the age of MPs, with younger MPs reporting higher levels of education.¹⁶ It was also related to gender, with female MPs reporting

13 Doyle, O., Pecukonis, E., & Harrington, D. (2011). The nurturant fathering scale: A confirmatory factor analysis with an African American sample of college students. *Research on Social Work Practice, 21*(3), 319-327.

14 Trinh, Viet Dung and Phau, Ian, A New Set of Measurements for the Materialism Scale (August 30, 2012). 2012 ANZMAC Annual Conference Proceedings, University of South Australia, Australia.

15 Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle, "Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and Political Attitudes," 1994.

16 $r(96)=-.281, p<.01$

higher levels of education on average.¹⁷

25% of MPs surveyed reported that their household earns less than 150,000 AFN per month. 31% reported that their household earns between 150,001 and 200,000 AFN per month; 19% 200,001 to 300,000 AFN; 5% more than 300,000 AFN per month. 20% of MPs refused to disclose their household's monthly income level. Interestingly, level of household income was inversely related to MPs' level of education, with less educated MPs reporting higher levels of household income.¹⁸ There was no significant difference between male and female MPs in level of monthly household income reported.¹⁹

The average length of time in parliament among the MPs surveyed was 6.5 years. 20% had been in parliament for four years or less; 40% for 4-5 years; 34% for 5-10 years. One MP reported to have been a parliamentarian for more than 10 years, and 4% declined to disclose how long they had been an MP. There was no significant difference between male and female MPs in length of time as an MP.²⁰ Most MPs reported having had longer careers in politics, the average duration of which was 20.5 years. 15% reported a career in politics of 4-5 years; 22% 5-10 years; 19% 10-20 years; 18% 20-30 years; 23% more than 30 years. 3% did not disclose the length of their career in politics. Male MPs had significantly longer careers in politics than female MPs on average, with the average male MP's career length in politics being 24 years, compared to 13 among female MPs.²¹

When asked about their job prior to becoming an MP, 31% reported to have previously worked in government, either as a civil servant or Provincial Council members. 16% had a background as a teacher or a lecturer, and 14% reported having a military/mujahid background. 12% were previously businessmen, 9% worked in NGOs, 4% were doctors, and 9% reported various civil society activities and/or social activism. 6% did not disclose their previous occupation. There were significant differences between male and female MPs in their backgrounds prior to becoming an MP.²² Considerably more male MPs reported having had previous careers related to the military/mujahidin (20% of male MPs versus 3% of female MPs), and in business (16% of male MPs versus 7% of female MPs). However, more female MPs reported having had previous careers as teachers or lecturers (29% of female MPs versus 11% of male MPs) and in NGOs (19% of female MPs versus 4% of male MPs).

17 $t(97)=2.84, p<.01$ (Male MPs N=69, M=5.72, SD=1.14; Female MPs N=32, M=6.22, SD=.61)

18 $r(83)=-.223, p<.05$

19 $t(79)=.877, p>.05$

20 $t(99)=-.198, p>.05$

21 $t(95)=5.14, p<.001$ (Male MPs N=69, M=24.20, SD=14.03; Female MPs N=33, M=12.79, SD=8.29)

22 $\chi^2(7, 102)=18.69, p<.01$

1.4 Limitations

The timeline of this research presented inherent limitations. Data collection took place from 20 April 2015 to 30 July 2015. This period coincided with Ramadan, during which data collection was more difficult, and the quality of participation may have been somewhat compromised during this period given the context. Additionally, the attack on the Parliament in June 2015 hindered the completion of data collection, limiting the data collectors' access to the Parliament. As such, the target number of surveys was lowered, thus resulting in a sample size that is only representative at a 90% confidence level and 6.12% margin of error, instead of the target 95% confidence level and 5% margin of error.

Given the sensitivity of the subject of corruption, it was decided that the survey should be self-administered to maximize participants' confidence in their anonymity and yield the most truthful answers. However, this decision came with a number of limitations. Given the difficulty of translating the survey instrument true to the intent of the English version, it was decided to only translate the survey into Dari, and no Pashto version of the survey was developed to ensure that all participants were receiving the same questions and avoid differences in meaning of the statements across two languages. Though all MPs surveyed understood Dari, it is an inherent limitation in that some of those surveyed were completing the survey in their second, rather than first, language. Additionally, though all MPs reported that they had at least completed primary school and participants were given the option to have the survey administered verbally, there were varying levels of literacy across participants that may have affected their interpretation and ability to accurately complete the survey.

Additionally, to mitigate the primacy and recency effect where respondents are likely to repeatedly choose either the first or last option in a response list, inverse coding was applied at random, meaning that some statements were phrased positively and others negatively. For example, though the scale from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree' was in the same order throughout the survey, one statement was "I do things without thinking," and another "I plan tasks carefully." Whereas an answer of 'strongly agree' on the first item would indicate a high level of impulsivity, the same answer on the second item would indicate a low level of impulsivity. As such, a respondent who was not paying close attention to the wording could accidentally put "disagree" instead of "agree".

Due to the difficulty of accessing the target population, the tools were not pretested prior to commencing the research. Though most of the scales and items selected have been extensively tested and developed, they have primarily been utilized in contexts outside of Afghanistan,

and predominantly in English. As such, with additional time, resources, and access, pretesting and revising the questionnaire prior to commencing the research would have been preferable. As such, some of the scales and items utilized in the survey did not perform as anticipated. As such, the authors only utilized scale measures where the value of Cronbach's alpha was greater than .05, and scales that did not meet this criterion were instead analyzed as individual variables. Additionally, much of the data was not normally distributed. As such, it was decided to utilize t-test, Chi-Square, and Spearman's rho to analyze relationships between variables as appropriate. Though Chi-Square and Spearman's rho are nonparametric tests, t-test is not, and as such these results should be considered to be approximate.

Reporting biases may have influenced the outcomes of the data, including social desirability bias and response bias. Social desirability bias is the tendency to answer in a way that will make the respondent look better from society's perspective. Given the personal and sensitive nature of items measuring personality and corruption, it is possible that participants answered some questions in a way that would make themselves look better as opposed to answering without bias. In order to address this possibility, confidentiality was of extreme importance in this study. Participants were made aware of confidentiality practices

and all measures were taken to ensure privacy during the survey. Despite measures taken to address this issue, it is possible that social desirability bias affected the outcomes.

Response bias means that individuals who have a high propensity to engage in corrupt behaviors or act primarily in self-interest are also less likely to complete this survey. Response bias was heightened due to the sampling technique used in this study because randomized sampling was not used. Because of response bias, the sample may not fully represent the proportion of MPs who engage in corrupt behaviors compared to those who do not.

Finally, experimenter bias may have influenced the results of this study because experimenters can unconsciously bias the results they obtain. Two experimenters collected data for this study, so to ensure continuity both experimenters were trained to use similar wording and procedures to collect the data. Both experimenters were female, so it is possible that their gender may have influenced the MPs during data collection.

2. Background

2.1 Legal and Electoral Framework

Afghanistan's current political system began to develop in the Bonn Accords of 5 December 2001, which established a roadmap to "reestablish permanent institutions of government." The Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003 passed a provisionally democratic constitution, establishing a separation and balance of powers of government, local and regional power sharing, and codifying the role of Islam. The constitution established a purely presidential system, with a directly elected president, two vice presidents, a bicameral legislature, and an independent judiciary. The legislature consists of a lower house, the elected Wolesi Jirga (House of the People), and the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders), which is divided equally among representatives of the elected Provincial Councils, representatives of elected District Councils, and presidential appointees.²³

Afghanistan has a Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system for legislative and provincial council elections. In the SNTV system, voters have only one vote and can only choose a single candidate on the ballot in their constituency, where the candidates with the highest number of valid votes win the seats allocated to their constituency. There are 35 multi-member constituencies, representing Afghanistan's 34 provinces and one Kuchi (nomadic people) constituency that covers the whole country.²⁴ Each constituency has a different number of seats in the parliament proportional to their population, estimated based on information provided by the general directorate of the Central Statistics Organization, which is obliged to provide the Commission with the latest accurate and official figures of the population of each province, city, Nahia (city area), district and village including Kuchis.²⁵

2.1a Quota System

The new constitution also introduced a quota system for the parliament, which reserved 27% of seats for women in the lower house and 17% of seats for women in the upper house. The Election Commission allocated reserved seats for the

23 J. Alexander Their, "The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan," *New York Law School Law Review* 51, 2006/07: 558-579.

24 "Primer on the Single Non-Transferable Vote System," UNAMA, n.g., <http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Election%20System%20in%20Afghanistan%20Primer.pdf>.

25 http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/legalframework/law/electorallaw_eng.pdf

Wolesi Jirga in each province based on its population until the total number of seats reserved for female candidates met the constitutional mandate. Both male and female candidates run for seats, and in cases where the minimum number of women do not win outright, female candidates who receive the most votes in each province are placed in the reserved seats. In the Meshrano Jirga, of the members appointed by the president, 50% must be women.²⁶

2.1b Political Parties

Afghanistan does not have a strong political party system. The SNTV system favors independent candidates and large, highly organized political parties. For example, in the 2009 presidential and Provincial Council elections, more than a hundred parties registered, and although over 80% of the Provincial Council candidates registered as independents, more than 30 parties fielded candidates. In the 2010-2015 parliament, 21 parties have representatives in the Wolesi Jirga,²⁷ though three fourths of Afghan MPs surveyed by Democracy International in 2012 did not identify with any political party.²⁸ Political parties generally have a limited political role, a fairly negative reputation, and do relatively little between elections. They are also generally criticized for a lack of policy-based platforms, driven instead by a reliance on the personality and patronage networks of the party leaders.²⁹

2.2 Women's Political Representation

2.2a Representation of Women in Political Positions outside of Parliament

Women's representation in political institutions is estimated to be 35% locally, 21% of Provincial Council members, and 28% of the Wolesi Jirga.³⁰ In 2014, 308 candidates on the

26 Mona Lena Krook, Diana Z. O'Brien and Krista M. Swip, "Military Invasion and Women's Political Representation," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 12, no. 1, 2010: 66-79.

27 "Political Parties in Afghanistan: A Review of the State of Political Parties after the 2009 and 2010 Elections," National Democratic Institute, June 2011.

28 "A Survey of the Afghan Parliament: Key Findings," Democracy International, July 2012.

29 Anna Larson, "Political Parties in Afghanistan," United States Institute of Peace, March 2015, <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR362-Political-Parties-in-Afghanistan.pdf>.

30 Marie S. Huber, "Gender Equality Score Card," EPD, 2015.

ballot for Provincial Council seats were female nationally, constituting 11% of candidates,³¹ and women won 21% of the seats available, of which 18 were non-quota winners.³² However, in 2014, the parliament lowered the quota for female Provincial Council members from 25% to 20%.³³ Afghanistan's first female Provincial Governor was appointed in 2005, and in 2015 President Ashraf Ghani appointed two female Provincial Governors in Daikundi and Ghor provinces, though the appointment of Seema Joyenda in Ghor province was met with protests from local leaders for appointing a woman to the position.³⁴ Women active in politics face a number of challenges in Afghanistan, where security issues continue to jeopardize women's representation. There have been a series of attacks on women politicians.³⁵ Several female politicians have been attacked or killed, and these security threats to women politicians continue to undermine advances in women's political representation.³⁶

2.2b Attitudes toward Female Politicians

Some internal opposition to quotas for women in parliament has been observed. In a 2012 survey of MPs, 55% felt that quotas are required for adequate representation, but of these, 47% did not believe the quotas should be for women. 60% agreed that the quota for women's representation in the Wolesi Jirga should represent a mandatory minimum percentage of representation for women, without limiting the number of seats that women can hold.³⁷

Additionally, in the annual national survey from The Asia Foundation, support for women's participation in political positions has actually been declining since 2008. In 2014, for the first time ever, the number of Afghans who felt that political positions in government should be mostly for men (46.1%) was greater than the number who felt that political positions should be shared equally between men and women (42.1%).³⁸

2.3 Corruption in Afghanistan

It is widely acknowledged that Afghanistan is among the most corrupt countries in the world. In 2014, Transparency International ranked Afghanistan 172nd out of 175 countries in its annual Corruption Perceptions Index. On a scale where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean, Afghanistan received a score of 12.³⁹ A survey focusing on perceptions and prevalence of administrative corruption in Afghanistan in 2014 found that Afghans believe corruption to be the second biggest problem facing Afghanistan, only after security. One out of five Afghans surveyed had faced corruption in the 2014 survey, and an estimated 105 billion AFN was paid in bribes within the past twelve months.⁴⁰ Corruption is widely institutionalized in Afghanistan, undermining access to many key public services.⁴¹

When asked to name the three public institutions respondents considered to be most corrupt, 12% of respondents named the Parliament, which classified it as the ninth most corrupt institution according to public perception. Only one percent of respondents felt that the Parliament had made progress in this regard, coming in fourth to last in this category.⁴² When asked about the most common type of corruption in the political system, 57% of respondents reported that ethnic, personal, family and party relations are the most common basis of corruption.⁴³

Members of the Wolesi Jirga have routinely engaged in various acts of corruption, including drug trafficking, electoral fraud, profit-skimming in organizing pilgrimages, war crimes, corruption in legislative voting and confirming cabinet members, colluding with government officials to secure jobs for associates, and facilitating non-competitive bidding on government contracts.⁴⁴ It is a generally established precedent for MPs to make lucrative business deals using their parliamentary positions.⁴⁵

31 "Elections in Afghanistan: April 5 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections," International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 27 March 2014, http://www.ifes.org/~media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2014_IFES_Afghanistan%20Presidential%20and%20PC%20Elections.pdf.

32 "Provincial Councils 2014: How did the women do?" Afghan Elections, 2014.

33 Marie S. Huber, "Gender Equality Score Card," EPD, 2015.

34 Ali M. Latifi, "Struggling to pave the way for future female leaders in Afghanistan," Los Angeles Times, 1 September 2015, <http://www.latimes.com/world/afghanistan-pakistan/la-fg-afghanistan-female-governor-20150831-story.html>

35 "Taliban kidnaps female Afghan politician, attacks undermine women's rights campaign," Reuters, 13 August 2013, http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/08/13/taliban_kidnaps_female_afghan_politician_attacks_undermine_womens_rights_campaign.html.

36 Marie S. Huber, "Gender Equality Score Card," EPD, 2015.

37 "A Survey of the Afghan Parliament," Democracy International, 2012.

38 Zach Warren, "Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People," The Asia Foundation, 2014.

39 Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2014 Survey Results," Presentation, 3 December 2014, http://transparency.org.my/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CPI-2014-Presentation_Final.pdf.

40 "Mohammad Razaq Isaqzadeh, « Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption : National Corruption Survey 2014," Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2014, http://iwaweb.org/ncs/_2014/docs/national_corruption_survey_2014_english.pdf.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Rukhail R. Bhavnani and Luke N. Condra, "Why People Vote for Corrupt Politicians: Evidence from Survey Experiments in Afghanistan," International Growth Centre, March 2012, <http://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Bhavnani-Condra-2012-Working-Paper.pdf>.

45 Anna Larson, "Political Parties in Afghanistan," 2015.

2.4 Facilitating Women's Representation: the Role and Effectiveness of Quota Systems

Along with arguments for improving the representation of women in politics has come a fundamental subsequent question—how? Dahlerup and Leyenaar observed that in many old Western democracies, it took around 100 years to achieve advancement in women's representation,⁴⁶ a timeframe that seems to be viewed as unacceptable for new democracies and in post-conflict contexts. As such, one of the most predominant means of ensuring women's representation has been the introduction of legal quotas, such as the mandatory 25% representation of women in Afghanistan's Wolesi Jirga. However, questions remain as to the effectiveness of such an approach to facilitating women's participation in politics.

Dahlerup and Freidenvall examine the quota systems implemented in Scandinavian countries, which represented an incremental track to equal political representation, compared to the fast track in countries such as Argentina, Costa Rica, and South Africa. In Costa Rica, women's representation in parliament leapt from 19% to 35% in one election, and 36% in South Africa's first democratic parliamentary election. They review three arguments for women's equal participation: (1) the justice argument, whereby women represent half the population and thus have the right to half the seats; (2) the experience argument, where women have difference biological and social constructed experience that should be represented; (3) the interest group argument, where women and men have partly conflicting interests and therefore men cannot represent women. In any case, they assert that the introduction of gender quotas represents a shift from the classical liberal notion of equality in terms of equal opportunity, towards a concept of equality of results. The latter notion is based on the idea that equal opportunity does not materialize simply with the removal of barriers advanced in the former.⁴⁷

Quota systems aim to address some of the structural barriers to women's political participation, such as disrupting gendered networks by opening up systems of closed and male-dominated patterns of recruitment. However, they do not address gender imbalances in campaign financing, obstacles for women when carrying out their responsibilities as elected politicians, and could even contribute to the stigmatization of women politicians. However, Dahlerup and Freidenvall also acknowledge that quotas could actually

put the burden on women, constructing them as the second sex and reproducing stereotyped gender roles unless the quota is advanced in a gender neutral way, such as 50-50 percent provisions or minimum levels of representation that apply to all genders.⁴⁸ This study reiterates the theory that generally, electoral systems based on proportional representation advance women's representation better than majority systems.⁴⁹

Importantly, Dahlerup and Freidenvall acknowledge that countries may legislate electoral gender quota provisions as actors sensitive to their international image. As a widely acknowledged key to equality, quotas demonstrate not only a willingness to address the issue of women's low political representation, but also a country's desire to construct itself as modern and innovative. This research, from 2003, addresses the increasing role of international media and the publicized nature of world leaders' meetings and subsequent media reporting on such events. The international image effect has likely only become more prevalent with time and the increased reach of national media and access to information.⁵⁰

Dahlerup and Friedenvall conclude that both the incremental and fast tracks have advantages and disadvantages. They assert that through the fast track method where women are given political positions from above, they tend to be made into tokens unless it is followed by considerable efforts at capacity-building, critique and support of the newcomers by women's organizations. On the other hand, the incremental track usually entails that elected women have a power base outside of parliament, but it takes much longer and the timeframe of such an approach is generally out of pace with world demand for gender balanced political institutions.⁵¹

Chen applies a Difference-in-Difference approach to assess the effect of gender quota systems, based on a dataset including 103 countries from 1970 to 2006, 22 of which have legal gender quotas, 47 with voluntary quotas, and 43 with no gender quotas. Chen finds that the average level of female legislators for the quota group was about 1.52 times larger than the non-quota group when including OECD countries, and 1.31 times larger when excluding OECD countries. However, the study also found that countries adopting gender quotas may also be countries with higher GDP per capita and/or with more social concerns. Including all countries, gender quotas and share of female legislators are significantly and positively related, where the proportion of female legislators after adopting gender quotas is 5.03 percentage points higher than in the non-quota group. The study also found that voluntary party quotas seemed to be more relevant to women's representation than legal

46 Dahlerup and Leyenaar, "The Move towards Gender Balance in Politics," 2013.

47 Drude Dahlerup and Lenita Freidenvall, "Quotas as a 'Fast Track' to Equal Political Representation for Women: Why Scandinavia is no longer the model," Paper presented at the IPSA World Congress, Durban, South Africa, 29 June to 4 July, 2003.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

quotas, which is attributed to the fact that political parties adopt voluntary quotas voluntarily, so they are less likely to be a symbolic policy.⁵²

Chen also found that increased representation of women in politics did affect government spending decisions, especially on issues related to women's traditional family role, primarily social welfare. Increasing the share of female legislators by one percentage point was found to correlate with an increased ratio of expenditure on social welfare to GDP by 0.28 percentage points.⁵³ This relationship was found to hold true as well in the case of gender quotas, indicating that this approach to increasing women's political participation can affect government spending priorities. However, while she concludes that the fast track approach through gender quotas has an effect on representation of women in politics, the increasing levels of female legislators in developing countries may not yet impact policy outcomes.⁵⁴

The impact of gender quotas remains a contested idea. Some have pointed out that in most national contexts, power holders (mostly male) are generally opposed to compulsory quota mechanisms, and try to water down the content of reforms.⁵⁵ Afghanistan has been used as a case study in multiple research projects to assess whether gender quotas actually make a difference, and the primary motivations for their implementation, especially in countries where women have relatively low status such as Afghanistan.⁵⁶

52 Li-Ju Chen, « Do Gender Quotas Influence Women's Representation and Policies ? » *The European Journal of Comparative Economics* 7, no. 1, 2010 : 13-60.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Eleonore Lepinard, "Gender Quotas and transformative politics," Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Global Governance Program, 2014, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31302/RSCAS_PP_2014_06.pdf?sequence=1.

56 Sarah Sunn Bush, "International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures," *International Organization* 65, 2011: 103-137.

Mona Lena Krook, Diana Z. O'Brien and Krista M. Swip, "Military Invasion and Women's Political Representation," 2010.

Others point out that gender quotas will never be enough in themselves to substantively improve women's political participation. Complementary measures advanced include introducing rules to reform day-to-day political practices to help women fulfill their goals beyond numbers, as well as implementing gender balance in legislative commissions and committees, as well as in public discourse time. Rules organizing political mandates should also be reformed such as pension schemes, family/parental/sickness leave policies, and provision of daycare services. Sexual harassment and discrimination in political institutions must be eliminated through adequate protocols. Electoral systems must be more inclusive and less adversarial, accompanied by fair rules for campaign financing that mitigate gendered disadvantages in campaign resource acquisition.⁵⁷ Other strategies advanced beyond quotas for promoting gender equality in elected office include expanding the pool of potential candidates, promoting broader transformation in public views towards women in politics, addressing political barriers to women's increased election, campaign support, forming women's caucuses, and introducing gender-neutral language in bills as well as procedural language.⁵⁸

57 Ibid.

58 Mona Lena Krook and Pippa Norris, "Beyond Quotas: Strategies to Promote Gender Equality in Elected Office," *Political Studies* 62, 2014: 2-20.

3. Examining Gender and Corruption in Afghanistan: Triangulating Findings with Existing Research

3.1 Gender and Corruption

3.1a Formative Development Research on Gender and Corruption

Based on existing research on gender behavioral differences, Dollar, Fisman and Gotti hypothesized that greater levels of representation of women in parliament would correspond to lower levels of corruption, measured according to the International Country Risk Guide's corruption index. The study found that even after controlling for GDP, civil liberties, population, average years of schooling, openness to trade, and ethnic fractionalization of a country, at the country level, higher rates of female participation in government are associated with lower levels of corruption.⁵⁹

Following this research, Swamy, Knack, Lee and Azfar further examined evidence on gender and corruption, with the caveat that their research does not claim essentialist biologically-determined differences between men and women, but rather observed difference attributable to socialization or other factors.⁶⁰ This research is structured more as meta-analysis of three sets of evidence. They found that in 18 World Values Surveys in 1981 and 43 in 1990-91, a significantly higher percentage of women than men believed that illegal or dishonest behavior is never justifiable across 12 different items. In the second case, using data from a World Bank study of corruption in Georgia including a survey of 350 firms, they found that firms owned or managed by women gave bribes on average 4.6% of the time they came in contact with a government agency, compared to 12.5% of the time in those owned or managed by men.⁶¹

Lastly, the Swamy et al. study looked at macro-level data on gender and corruption, using the Graft index to measure corruption and again utilizing the proportion of legislators in the national parliament who are female, but also accounting for the proportion of ministers and high-level government

bureaucrats who are women and women's share of the labor force as a composite index of women's participation. Importantly, this study clarified that this relationship is hypothesized as twofold: (1) legislative corruption is an important dimension of governmental corruption, and if women accept fewer bribes, the incidence of legislative corruption will be lower where women hold more seats; (2) members of parliament could influence the incidence of bureaucratic and judicial corruption by passing laws to deter bribery, through their influence on appointments, or by placing corruption on the public agenda. Controlling for per capita income, average years of education completed by adults, religion, history of colonialism, ethnic division, and democratic institutions using the Freedom House political freedoms indicator, the study found that women's participation is a significant predictor of state corruption. Additionally, the research found that the impact of women's participation is greater in countries where the gender gap is larger.⁶²

Experimental Research

Following these studies, there has been a considerable body of experimental research on gender and corruption. Alatas et al. conducted an experiment to determine where gender differences exist in the acceptability of corruption, and to examine whether they differ between countries, with case studies in Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore. They only found gender differences in Australia, and found that male behavior was generally consistent between countries, whereas female behavior varied.⁶³ A similar study by Alatas et al. in 2009, again using the same geographic points for data collection, determined that gender differences regarding corruption may not be as universal as assumed, and again drew the point of cultural specificity. They found that while women in Australia were less tolerant of corruption, again there were no significant gender differences in India, Indonesia and Singapore. They attribute these findings to different social roles of women across cultures, and assert that in relatively more patriarchal societies where women do not have as active of a role in the public domain, women's views may be influenced to a greater extent by men's

59 David Dollar, Raymond Fisman, and Roberta Gatti, "Are Women Really the 'Fairer' Sex? Corruption and Women in Government," The World Bank Development Research Group, Policy Research Report on Gender and Development, Working Paper Series, No. 4, October 1999.

60 Anand Swamy, Stephen Knack, Young Lee, and Omar Azfar, "Gender and Corruption," Center for Development Economics, Williams College, CDE Working Paper Series, August 2000.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid

63 Vivi Alatas, Lisa Cameron, Ananish Chaudhuri, Nisvan Erkal, and Lata Gangadharan, "Gender and Corruption: Insights from an experimental analysis," University of Melbourne, 2005.

views. With this, they assert that in such societies, it can be expected that there will be less of a gender difference in behavior toward corruption compared to societies where women feel more comfortable voicing their own opinions, tying into arguments related to liberal democracy and social institutions.⁶⁴

Lambsdorff and Frank conducted an experiment with university students in Germany constructing a scenario in which a businessperson has no choice but to give a gift or bribe to a public servant, with a number of different choices available for the businessperson and the public servant. The experiment found that men tended to engage in positive reciprocity, delivering to the briber, and were more willing to play negative reciprocity, blowing the whistle when the bribe was not reciprocated. These findings were in line with a stronger sense for reciprocity among men and a concern for equality among women found in previous research. Women were found to be unreliable in terms of reciprocating corrupt favors. However, the researchers also referenced previous research that found that women do exhibit reciprocal behavior towards friends and other close individuals.⁶⁵

In the last experimental study reviewed, Djawadi and Fahr modeled an experiment where participants either had earned or endowed income, and received additional income with the option to take or refuse an additional payment representing the bribe, which came with a risk. Consistent with previous literature, this experiment found that women are more risk-averse than men. However, the data also suggested that possibly, women in this context are just as prone to engage in illegal activities than men, despite displaying more risk aversion.⁶⁶

Similar to these findings, in a later review of lessons from laboratory corruption experiments, Frank, Lambsdorff and Boehm, revisit six laboratory studies and conclude that if women are involved in a potentially corrupt transaction, it is more likely to fail. They observe that the reason is not that women are naturally more honest, but rather they are more opportunistic when they have the chance to break a corrupt contract and are less engaged in retaliating nonperformance. Essentially, they assert that women react more strongly to a given risk of detection, and are less willing to establish trust with corrupt criminals.⁶⁷

64 Vivi Alatas, Lisa Cameron, Ananish Chaudhuri, Nisvan Erkal, and Lata Gangadharan, "Gender, Culture, and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis," *Southern Economic Journal* 75, no. 3, 2009: 663-680.

65 Johann Graf Lambsdorff and Bjorn Frank, "Corrupt reciprocity—Experimental evidence on a men's game," *International Review of Law and Economics*, 2011.

66 Behnud M. Djawadi and Rene Fahr, "The Impact of Risk Perception and Risk Attitudes on Corrupt Behavior: Evidence from a Petty Corruption Experiment, IZA, Discussion Paper No. 7383, May 2013.

67 Bjorn Frank, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, and Frederic Boehm, "Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments," *European Journal of Development Research* 23, 2011: 59-71.

3.1b Findings on Beliefs about and Exposure to Corruption

In this research, there were no significant differences between male and female MPs on any of the items related to beliefs about and exposure to corruption. 51% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that many other male MPs are corrupt, while 49% felt the same regarding female MPs.

Beliefs About Corruption

Only 6% of all respondents strongly or somewhat agreed that a small bribe is not as bad as a large bribe, though 59% of respondents strongly disagreed with this statement. Similarly, only 2% of respondents somewhat agreed that under certain circumstances, it is sometimes okay to take a bribe, where 69% strongly disagreed with this statement.

However, 60% of all respondents disagreed, strongly or somewhat disagreed with the statement that it is possible to be successful in government or politics in Afghanistan without engaging in corrupt acts and practices. Only 16% strongly agreed with this statement. Additionally, 75% agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that it is normal for MPs to use their position to do favors for other people. Only 4% of respondents strongly disagreed with this statement. None of the beliefs about corruption were significantly related to gender, age, monthly household income, level of education, length of time in parliament, or length of career in politics.

Exposure to Corruption

MPs reported high levels of exposure to corruption. 93% agreed or strongly agreed that people often approach them to ask for favors. Only one MP strongly disagreed with this statement. 88% agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that people often do favors for them or members of their family, with no MPs strongly disagreeing with this statement. Consistent with MPs demonstrating strong beliefs about the impropriety of bribery, only 11% reported that people often approach them to offer bribes or compensation for favors. 47% strongly disagreed with this statement.

Reporting that people often approach them to ask for favors was positively correlated with age, indicated that older MPs were more likely to agree with this statement.⁶⁸ Reporting that people often do favors for them or members of their family was associated with level of education, where those with lower levels of education were more likely to agree with this statement.⁶⁹ Reporting that people often

68 $rs(97) = .206, p < .05$

69 $rs(97) = .214, p < .05$

approach them to offer bribes or compensation for favors was associated with both age⁷⁰ and monthly household income,⁷¹ where older MPs and MPs with lower monthly household incomes were more likely to agree with this statement.

Religiousness⁷²

Religiousness was associated with a number of items related to corruption. Participants who reported themselves to be very religious were also more likely to agree that under certain circumstances it is okay to take a bribe,⁷³ and to report that people often approach them to offer bribes or compensation for favors.⁷⁴ Additionally, those who reported themselves to be more religious were also less likely to believe that it is possible to be successful in government or politics in Afghanistan without doing corrupt things.⁷⁵

Progressive/Conservative Beliefs

MPs were also asked to what extent they agree or disagree with a number of statements designed to gauge the level of progressive or conservative values. Differences between men and women were not significant on any of these items. 90% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they support the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) Law. However, 59% also agreed, strongly or somewhat agreed that shelters for abused women are not an appropriate solution for domestic abuse in Afghanistan. 83% also agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that human rights principles are not against Afghan values, and only 12% agreed or strongly agreed that human rights are Western values. 70% agreed, somewhat, or strongly agreed that it is okay for people to have different values in society. However, 77% also agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that it is important that everyone should have the same “Afghan values.” Interestingly, there was no significant difference between male and female MPs in the belief that the quota system for women in parliament is a good thing.⁷⁶ 82% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that it is a good thing, while only 8% disagreed or strongly disagreed.

There were few relationships between these items and variables measuring exposure to and perceptions of corruption. The item regarding human rights and Afghan values was inversely related to the belief that it is normal for MPs to use their position to do favors for other people, where people who felt that human rights principles are not against Western values were also less likely to think that it

70 rs(95)=.264, p<.05
 71 rs(82)=.261, p<.05
 72 5-item scale (A1-A5), N=93, Cronbach's alpha=.701
 73 rs(102)=.501, p<.001
 74 rs(102)=.321, p<.001
 75 rs(97)=-.210, p<.05
 76 t(45)=.508, p>.05

is normal.⁷⁷ The belief that human rights are Western values was inversely related to the belief that it is possible to be successful in government or politics in Afghanistan without doing corrupt things, where those who thought that human rights are Western values were also more likely to believe it is not possible.⁷⁸ Additionally, the belief that it is important that everyone have the same Afghan values was related to a number of variables. Those who felt that it is important for everyone to have the same values were also more likely to think it is normal for MPs to use their position to do favors for people,⁷⁹ and to report that people often do favors for them or members of their family.⁸⁰ In these items, though progressive versus conservative beliefs appear to have little effect on corrupt beliefs or behaviors, it does also appear that where the relationship exists, more conservative beliefs are related to more corrupt practices and beliefs.

3.2 Behavioral Differences and Personality Traits

In the survey, thirty-five items asked to what extent MPs agreed or disagreed with statements designed to measure seven personality traits: impulsivity, confidence, risk aversion, selfishness, nurturing, materialism, and honesty, as well as a section measuring participants' SDO. This section examines existing research and hypotheses, as well as findings from this research regarding whether these traits were correlated with exposure to and beliefs about corruption, and whether there were significant gender differences in each of the traits.

3.2a Existing Research

In the previously reviewed research on gender and corruption in government, Dollar, Fisman and Gatti reviewed numerous behavioral studies that found evidence that women are more trustworthy and public-spirited than men.⁸¹ Research found that women are more likely to exhibit ‘helping’ behavior,⁸² vote based on social issues;⁸³ score more highly on ‘integrity tests’;⁸⁴ take stronger stances on ethical behavior;⁸⁵ and behave more generously when faced

77 rs(97)=-.256, p<.05
 78 rs(93)=-.258, p<.05
 79 rs(94)=.281, p<.01
 80 rs(93)=.249, p<.05
 81 David Dollar, Raymond Fisman, and Roberta Gatti, “Are Women Really the ‘Fairer’ Sex?” October 1999.
 82 A.H. Eagly and M. Crowley, “Gender and Helping Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Social Psychology Literature,” *Psychological Bulletin* 100, 1986: 238-308.
 83 T.G. Goertzel, “That Gender Gap: Sex, Family Income, and Political Opinions in the Early 1980s,” *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 11, 1983: 209-222.
 84 Deniz S. Ones and Chockalingam Viswesvaran, “Gender, Age, and Race Differences On Overt Integrity Tests: Results Across Four Large-scale Job Applicant Data Sets,” *Journal of Applied Psychology* 83, no. 1, 1998: 35-42.
 85 Sandra H. Glover, Minnette A. Bumpus, John E. Logan, and James R. Ciesla, “Reexamining the Influence of Individual Values on Ethical Decisionmaking,” *Journal of Business Ethics* 16, no. 12/13, 1997: 1319-1329.
 Michelle C. Reiss and Kaushik Mitra, “The Effects of Individual Difference Factors on

with economic decisions.⁸⁶

Torgler and Valev studied whether women are more willing to be compliant than men, and whether there are behavioral differences over time due to a cohort effect—i.e. differences in attitudes among similar age groups in different time periods—or an age effect. Using data from the World Values Surveys and the European Values Surveys from 1981 to 1999 and controlling variables like education, marital status, economic status, occupational status, and individuals' trust in the legal system and parliament, their research discovered a strong gender effect where women are more willing to comply than men, and women are less likely to agree that cheating on taxes can be justified. They also found that there was no decay over time in this gender difference, which contradicts role theory which suggests that increasing gender equality would lead to decreasing gender differences over time. This was further backed by the lack of a cohort effect and the finding of an age effect.⁸⁷

Gender Behavioral Differences According to Context

Other studies have found gender differences in corrupt behavior depending on the price and context. Andreoni and Vesterlund studied differences in “demand for altruism” in a dictator game, and found that when the price of altruism is high, women are more generous, whereas when the price is low men are more altruistic. This finding indicates that altruistic behaviors depend on the price of giving, where men are more price elastic and women more egalitarian. In another study, Song et al. examined gender differences in other-regarding behavior when subjects are responsible for a group. They found that men are less other-regarding when they are acting on behalf of a group than when they act on their own behalf, whereas women did not exhibit this difference.⁸⁸

Wangnerud further advances a “rationality perspective,” asserting that when calculating costs and benefits, women more often than men choose not to engage in corrupt behavior, based on subnational variation in Mexico.⁸⁹ In opposition to other research in the field, Wangnerud suggests a mixed model that considers when and under what circumstances it is reasonable to believe that gender is a factor driving the results, and which gender theory is

applicable. According to the rationality perspective, it may be that women are not only excluded from men's networks, but may actively seek to build alternative power bases in the form of social movements, which often have a watchdog role regarding abuse of public office and as such would make engaging in corruption particularly risky for women by damaging their chances to gain support in future political races. Additionally, at a citizen level Wangnerud advances that it is necessary to consider the fact that women usually have fewer assets than men, in which context women would rationally abstain from corrupt behavior and negotiate to pay the least amount possible when asked for bribes. In conclusion, Wangnerud asserts that women might make different choices than men about corruption not due to inherent differences, but rather because of their different contexts, which are culturally and socially specific.⁹⁰

Research from Psychology

Past research has made attempts to understand which personality traits motivate ethical behavior versus those that motivate corrupt behavior; however, most existing research on this topic concerns Westernized cultures and does little to understand cultures and contexts that do not fit into this perspective. The Five-Factor Model of personality suggests that five main factors underpin personality traits: neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness.⁹¹ Neuroticism is the tendency to be emotionally erratic, depressed, anxious, and lacking self-esteem or confidence. Extraversion is the tendency to be sociable, dominant, and active. Openness to experience is the interest in learning, new ideas, and culture. Agreeableness is the tendency to be nurturing, kind, and polite. Conscientiousness is the tendency to act cautiously, strive for achievement, be dependable, and orderly. This study seeks to understand corruption in Afghanistan from a psychological perspective by examining personality traits that the authors hypothesize may be correlated with corruption: impulsivity, confidence, risk aversion, nurturing, selfishness, materialism, and honesty. Furthermore, this study seeks to examine differences between men and women in each of these personality traits.

3.2b Gender and Risk Aversion

Existing Research

Another area of asserted gendered behavioral difference related to corruption is in the risk aversion of men and women, where risk aversion is the preference for a sure outcome over a gamble with higher or equal expected

the Acceptability of Ethical and Unethical Workplace Behaviors,” *Journal of Business Ethics* 17, no. 14, 1998: 1581-1593.

86 Catherine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman, “Are Women Less Selfish Than Men?: Evidence from Dictator Experiments,” *Economic Journal* 108, 1998: 726-735.

87 Benno Torgler and Neven T. Valev, “Women and illegal activities: gender differences and women's willingness to comply over time,” Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), Working Paper Nr. 2006-15, 2006.

88 Ibid.

89 Lena Wangnerud, “Variation in Corruption between Mexican States: Elaborating the Gender Perspective,” Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, 9 February 2011, http://www.ipd.gu.se/infogluCalendar/digitalAssets/1772626008_BifogadFil_Wangnerud-underlag.pdf.

90 Ibid.

91 Connelly and Ones, “The Personality of Corruption: A National-Level Analysis”, 2008.

value.⁹² Croson and Gneezy reviewed a series of ten experimental studies largely from the field of economics on gendered differences in risk aversion. They found that men are considerably more risk-prone than women, and conversely, women are more risk averse than men in the vast majority of environments and tasks. However, there were some important caveats to these findings, where in one study it was found that there were gender differences among whites, but not among other ethnic groups, indicating that there may be cultural biases that contribute to gender differences in risk-taking.

Another of the studies reviewed found one situation when men were more risk-averse than women, where lotteries are framed as losses rather than gains. Among the explanations offered for these findings, Croson and Gneezy identified gender-differentiated emotional reactions to risky situations, men's greater overconfidence in their success in uncertain situations than women, and men's general interpretation of risky situations as a challenge versus women's interpretation of the situation as a threat.⁹³ Further adding to this discourse, Eckel and Grossman reviewed evidence from public-good, ultimatum, and dictator experience and found that there was no convincing evidence of gender differences in behavior when subjects are exposed to risk, but in the absence of risk women are less individually-oriented and more socially-oriented.⁹⁴ However, there were considerable limitations to this study, including possible cultural biases, with the results being for white participants but not for other ethnic groups. Since this study is interested in risk aversion among Afghan MPs, the authors hypothesize that individuals who are high in risk aversion will be less corrupt than those who are less risk averse. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that women will be more risk averse than men.

Findings

In this research, no gender differences were found for any of the five items examining risk aversion. 35% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they do things they don't want to do in order to keep up with other members of parliament. 91% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that it is important to be safe and cautious, and 89% that it is important to follow the rules because of the belief that if they don't they may get caught and get in trouble. 40% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they go out of their way to avoid conflict. However, 68% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that big risks are worth big rewards.

92 Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). "Choices, values, and frames". *American Psychologist* 39: 341-350.

93 Rachel Croson and Uri Gneezy, "Gender Differences in Preferences," *Journal of Economic Literature* 47, no. 2, 2009: 1-27.

94 Maria Fernanda Rivas, "An experiment on corruption and gender," *Departamento de Economica, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la Republica, Documentos de Trabajo, Documento no 08/06, September 2006.*

Five items examined the trait risk aversion.⁹⁵ Reporting that a small bribe is not as bad as a large bribe was related to going out of one's way to avoid conflict,⁹⁶ suggesting higher levels of risk aversion is related to higher levels of corruption.

3.2c Gender and Impulsivity

Existing Research

Past research has linked neuroticism with lower levels of ethical leadership and higher levels of workplace deviance.⁹² This finding was the basis for including impulsivity and confidence in the present study. Past research has shown that neurotic individuals tend to be more impulsive, suggesting that impulsive individuals may also be less ethical than their non-impulsive peers.⁹⁷ Further supporting inclusion of impulsivity in this study, conscientiousness has consistently been related to ethical leadership in past research. This suggests that individuals who think carefully before acting are more likely to act ethically.⁹² The authors hypothesize that individuals who do not think about their actions before acting may be more likely to commit acts of corruption because they will not have time to reconsider or to think of potential consequences.

Findings

No gender differences were found for any of the five items examining impulsivity. Only 9% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they do things without thinking, 7% that they say things without thinking, and 4% that they do things without thinking about the consequences first.

All (100%) respondents agreed, somewhat, or strongly agreed that they plan tasks carefully. However, 42% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they are more interested in the present than the future.

Five items examined the trait impulsivity.⁹⁸ Reporting doing things without thinking was positively related to reporting that people often approach the respondent to offer bribes or compensation for favors,⁹⁹ the belief that a small bribe is not as bad as a large bribe,¹⁰⁰ and the belief that under

95 "I do things I don't really want to do in order to keep up with other members of parliament," "It is important to be safe and cautious," "Big risks are worth big rewards," "I go out of my way to avoid conflict," and "It is important to follow the rules because if I don't I may get caught and get in trouble."

96 $rs(101)=.266, p<.01$

97 Bratton and Strittmatter, "To Cheat or Not to Cheat?: The Role of Personality in Academic and Business Ethics," 2013.

98 "I do things without thinking," "I plan tasks carefully," "I say things without thinking," "I am more interested in the present than the future," and "I do things without thinking about the consequences first."

99 $rs(101)=.374, p<.001$

100 $rs(100)=.311, p<.01$

certain circumstances it is okay to take a bribe.¹⁰¹ Similarly, reporting saying things without thinking was related to reporting that people often approach the respondent to offer bribes or compensation for favors¹⁰² and the belief that a small bribe is not as bad as a large bribe.¹⁰³ Reporting doing things without thinking about the consequences first was positively related to the belief that under certain circumstances, it is sometimes okay to take a bribe.¹⁰⁴ Reporting planning tasks carefully was inversely related to reporting that people often approach the respondent for favors,¹⁰⁵ people doing favors for the respondent or members of their family,¹⁰⁶ and the belief that it is normal for MPs to use their position to do favors for people.¹⁰⁷ These findings would indicate that more impulsive individuals are more likely to be exposed to and engage in corruption.

3.2d Gender and Confidence

Existing Research

Neurotic individuals also tend to be less confident.⁹² A high level of neuroticism is correlated with employee perceptions of workplace bullying, which corresponds with the idea that some individuals may feel coerced by their peers or constituents into committing acts of corruption. The authors hypothesize that individuals who score low on confidence will score higher on corruption. Based on the literature on gendered networks and opportunities for corruption, it is further hypothesized that women will score lower on confidence than men.

Findings

On average, female MPs demonstrated higher levels of confidence than men on one item.¹⁰⁸ Whereas 48% of male MPs agreed, strongly or somewhat agreed that they feel concerned about the impression that they make on other people, only 31% of female MPs felt the same. Four other items also examined confidence, and none of those items revealed significant gender differences. 93% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they are good at their job, 90% that they are a respected member of their field, and 98% that they feel confident about their abilities. However, 80% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they often worry about what others think of them.

101 $rs(101)=-.293, p<.01$

102 $rs(103)=-.276, p<.01$

103 $rs(102)=-.266, p<.01$

104 $rs(101)=-.268, p<.01$

105 $rs(105)=-.199, p<.05$

106 $rs(101)=-.240, p<.05$

107 $rs(102)=-.206, p<.05$

108 B10 (confidence). On average, women ($M = 4.25, SE = .318$) scored higher than men ($M = 3.25, SE = .225$) on the item, "I feel concerned about the impression that I make on other people." This difference was significant $t(95) = -2.553, p < .05, r = .25$.

Five items examined the trait confidence.¹⁰⁹ Believing that it is okay to take a bribe under certain circumstances was inversely related to how confident respondents felt about their abilities, suggesting that lower confidence relates to a higher level of corruption.¹¹⁰ Whether the MP is approached for favors often was related to the statement that the respondent is good at their job,¹¹¹ as well as the respondent feeling that they are a respected member of their field,¹¹² suggesting that higher levels of confidence relates to a higher level of corruption. Reporting that other people do favors for the respondent or their family was related to the respondent feeling confident about their abilities,¹¹³ also suggesting that higher confidence relates to higher corruption. These relationships yield unclear conclusions, with one relationship suggesting that higher confidence levels are related to lower levels of corruption, while the other three relationships suggest that higher confidence levels are related to higher levels of corruption.

3.2e Gender, Nurturing, and Selfishness

Existing Research

Past research on agreeableness has been inconsistent, with some results suggesting higher levels of agreeableness is related to lower levels of corruption, and other results suggesting there is not a significant relationship between agreeableness and corruption.^{Error! Bookmark not defined.} Nurturing and selfishness are related to agreeableness, and both traits will be used for the current study. Nurturing, for the purposes of this study, is caring for family and acting in their best interest. Selfishness is devoted to or caring only for oneself. The two terms are closely related, but an important distinction is made in that nurturing has to do with how one relates to his or her family, whereas selfishness has to do with how one relates to others in general. The authors hypothesize that individuals who score high on nurturing will score lower on corruption. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that women will score higher on nurturing than men. Concerning selfishness, it is hypothesized that individuals who score higher on selfishness will score higher on corruption.

Findings

No significant gender differences were found for any of the five items examining nurturing. 77% of respondents agreed,

109 "I am good at my job," "I often worry about what others think about me," "I feel that I am a respected member of my field," "I feel confident about my abilities," and "I feel concerned about the impression that I make on other people."

110 $rs(102)=-.235, p<.05$

111 $rs(102)=-.282, p<.01$

112 $rs(103)=-.224, p<.05$

113 $rs(100)=-.228, p<.05$

somewhat or strongly agreed that they put their family's needs before their own, and 73% that they are available to spend time with their immediate family. 48% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that as they go through their day, their immediate family is often on their mind, and 69% that they do what's right for their immediate family even if it doesn't feel good for them. However, 18% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that members of their immediate family do not feel comfortable talking to them about personal problems.

Five items examined the trait nurturing.¹¹⁴ Members of the immediate family feeling comfortable talking about personal problems with the respondent was inversely related to the belief that a small bribe is not as bad as a large bribe,¹¹⁵ and the belief that under certain circumstances it is okay to take a bribe,¹¹⁶ suggesting that higher levels of nurturing are associated with lower levels of corruption. Reporting being available to spend time with immediate family was related to reporting that people often do favors for them or members of their family,¹¹⁷ that people often approach them to ask for favors,¹¹⁸ and the belief that it is normal for MPs to use their position to do favors for people.¹¹⁹

No significant gender differences were found for any of the five items examining selfishness. 96% of respondents agreed, strongly or somewhat agreed that it is more important to help people than to make a lot of money or gain prestige, 89% that if they had to split their favorite food in half and give one half to their friend, they would always give their friend the bigger half, and 92% that they enjoy sharing what they have. However, 20% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that when someone asks for their help, they only help if it will benefit them, and 19% that they will pressure or manipulate people so things go the way they want them to.

Five items examined the trait selfishness.¹²⁰ The belief that it is normal for members of parliament to use their position to do favors for others was inversely related to the belief that it is more important to help people than to gain money or prestige,¹²¹ suggesting that lower levels of selfishness are related to lower levels of corruption. The same corruption item was negatively related to the item saying

114 "I put my family's needs before my own," "Members of my immediate family do not feel comfortable talking to me about personal problems," "I am available to spend time with my immediate family," "As I go through my day, my immediate family is often on my mind," and "I do what's right for my immediate family even if it doesn't feel good for me."

115 $rs(99)=-.298, p<.01$

116 $rs(100)=-.254, p<.01$

117 $rs(100)=.304, p<.01$

118 $rs(104)=.198, p<.05$

119 $rs(102)=.220, p<.05$

120 "In my job it is more important for me to help people than to make a lot of money or gain prestige," "If I had to split my favorite food in half and give one half to my friend, I would always give my friend the bigger half," "When someone asks for my help, I only help if it will benefit me," "I enjoy sharing what I have," and "If necessary, I will pressure or manipulate people so things go the way I want them to."

121 $rs(102)=-.210, p<.05$

the respondent would give the bigger half of a food item with a friend,¹²² suggesting that lower levels of selfishness are related to lower levels of corruption. Reporting that the respondent is approached for favors was inversely related to the item saying the respondent would give the bigger half of a food item with a friend,¹²³ suggesting that lower levels of selfishness are related to lower levels of corruption. The same item regarding being approached for favors was inversely related to the respondent enjoying sharing what they have,¹²⁴ suggesting that lower levels of selfishness are related to lower levels of corruption. Reporting often being approached to offer bribes or compensation for favors was related to pressuring or manipulating people so things go the way they want,¹²⁵ suggesting that higher levels of selfishness are related to higher levels of corruption.

3.2f Gender, Materialism, and Honesty

Existing Research

Materialism, while not related to The Big Five of the Five-Factor Model, is of interest to the current study because the authors hypothesized that individuals who score higher on materialism will be more corrupt than their non-materialistic counterparts. Honesty is also unrelated to the Five-Factor Model, and it is hypothesized that individuals who are less honest will be more corrupt than those who are more honest.

Findings

On average, men were more likely to report that they feel good when they buy expensive things because it makes them look good.¹²⁶ Whereas 27% of male MPs agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they feel good when they buy expensive things because it makes them look good, only 6% of female MPs felt the same. 77% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that material possessions are not important because they do not have an effect on their happiness, and only 9% that when their friends or family have things they cannot afford, it bothers them. However, 71% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that a country that has more material possessions is better (more civilized) than a country that has fewer material possessions, and 19% that they would rather pay more to get a more distinctive item that they think fewer people will have.

122 $rs(98)=-.265, p<.01$

123 $rs(99)=-.271, p<.01$

124 $rs(104)=-.236, p<.05$

125 $rs(103)=-.201, p<.042$

126 $t(79)=2.11, p<.05$ (Male MPs N=70, M=4.93, SD=1.86; Female MPs N=32, M=5.63, SD=1.39)

Five items examined the trait materialism.¹²⁷ Reporting feeling good when buying expensive things was related to reporting that people often approach them to offer bribes or compensation for favors¹²⁸ and the belief that under certain circumstances it is sometimes okay to take a bribe,¹²⁹ suggesting that higher levels of materialism are related to higher levels of corruption. Reporting that material possessions do not have an effect on their happiness was inversely related to reporting that people often do favors for them or members of their family,¹³⁰ suggesting that lower levels of materialism are related to lower levels of corruption. Reporting being bothered when friends or family have items that the respondent cannot afford was related to the item stating that a small bribe is not as bad as a large bribe¹³¹ and the item saying that under certain circumstances it is okay to take a bribe¹³², suggesting that higher levels of materialism are related to higher levels of corruption.

On average, females demonstrated higher levels of honesty than males on two items.¹³³ 94% of female MPs agreed, strongly or somewhat agreed that people consider them a “trustworthy” person, while 90% of males felt the same. 100% of female MPs agreed, strongly or somewhat agreed that they feel like they are an honest person, and 97% of male MPs answered the same way. Three other items also examined honesty and did not reveal significant gender differences. Only 14% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they make excuses to explain when they don’t do something they said they would do, and only 17% that they do not feel guilty when they tell someone a story that is not entirely true. 96% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they would rather tell the truth and get in trouble than lie to get out of trouble.

Five items examined the trait honesty.¹³⁵ Reporting not feeling guilty when telling a story that is not entirely true was inversely related to the belief that it is okay to take a bribe under certain circumstances¹³⁶ the belief that small

127 “I feel good when I buy expensive things because it makes me look good,” “Material possessions are not important because they do not have an effect on my happiness,” “When my friends or family have things I cannot afford, it bothers me,” “A country that has more material possessions is better (more civilized) than a country that has fewer material possessions,” “and “I would rather pay more to get a more distinctive item that I think fewer people will have.”

128 $r(102) = -.269, p < .01$

129 $r(102) = .201, p < .05$

130 $r(99) = -.246, p < .05$

131 $r(100) = .212, p < .05$

132 $r(101) = .266, p < .01$

133 B32 (honesty). On average, women ($M = 1.53, SE = .142$) scored higher than men ($M = 1.96, SE = .125$) on the item, “People who know me consider me a ‘trustworthy’ person.” This difference was significant $t(99) = 2.053, p < .05, r = .20$.

134 B35 (honesty). On average, women ($M = 1.18, SE = .081$) scored higher than men ($M = 1.58, SE = .089$) on the item, “I feel that I am an honest person.” This difference was significant $t(102) = 2.789, p < .01, r = .27$.

135 “I make excuses to explain when I don’t do something I said I would do,” “People who know me consider me a ‘trustworthy’ person,” “I would rather tell the truth and get in trouble than tell a lie to get out of trouble,” “I do not feel guilty when I tell someone a story that is not entirely true,” and “I feel that I am an honest person.”

136 $r(101) = -.475, p < .001$

bribes are not as bad as large bribes,¹³⁷ and reporting that people often approach the respondent to offer bribes or compensation for favors,¹³⁸ suggesting that higher levels of honesty are related to higher levels of corruption. Reporting feeling that the respondent is an honest person was inversely related to the belief that a small bribe is not as bad as a large bribe, indicating that higher levels of self-perceived honesty are related to higher levels of corruption.¹³⁹ Reporting that people consider the respondent a “trustworthy” person was related to the item stating that people often approach the respondent to ask for favors¹⁴⁰ and the item stating that people often do favors for the respondent and the respondent’s family,¹⁴¹ suggesting that higher levels of honesty are related to higher levels of corruption.

3.2g Social Dominance Orientation

Existing Research

According to Social Dominance Theory, society is made up of group-oriented social hierarchies, and intergroup oppression and conflict serves to establish and maintain these hierarchical social systems.¹⁴² SDO is the degree to which individuals desire to have their own in-group dominate and be superior to generalized out-groups, and support generalized hierarchical relationships among groups in society.¹⁴³ A social dominance oriented individual would favor group inequality in general, and consequently they would support ideologies that justify group inequality and policies that enforce or maintain group inequality.

Regarding SDO and the gender gap in elite positions, SDO theory postulates that elite, authoritative, militaristic, and diplomatic roles serve to maintain or increase social inequality, and as such are hierarchy enhancing.¹⁴⁴ Conversely, roles that open access to resources or redistribute resources in ways that oppose the existing status structure are hierarchy attenuating. SDO predicts that individuals who are higher on SDO or hold hierarchy-enhancing beliefs will be more likely to seek hierarchy-enhancing roles, whereas those who are low on SDO and hold hierarchy-attenuating beliefs will seek hierarchy-attenuating roles. Studies have shown that high- and low-SDO people seek roles compatible with their levels of SDO.¹³⁹ Most importantly in the context of this research, males tend to have significantly higher levels of SDO than

137 $r(100) = -.373, p < .001$

138 $r(101) = -.358, p < .001$

139 $r(101) = -.223, p < .05$

140 $r(101) = .253, p < .05$

141 $r(98) = .238, p < .05$

142 Wilson and Liu, “Social dominance orientation and gender: The moderating role of gender identity,” 2003.

143 Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo, “Social Dominance Orientation and the Political Psychology of Gender: A Case of Invariance?,” 1994.

Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell, “In-Group Identification, Social Dominance Orientation, and Differential Intergroup Social Allocation,” 2001.

144 Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle, “Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and Political Attitudes,” 1994.

females.^{137,145} This suggests that females would be less likely to seek elite positions, such as Members of Parliament (MP), or could suggest that those who do, do so at the behest of others who may command significant influence over their actions as an MP. Social Dominance Orientation could provide an alternate explanation for higher male propensity to engage in corruption and support policies that maintain inequality, including candidate recruitment and legislative procedures. The connection between SDO and corruption in government as it relates to gender has not been explored in existing research.

Findings

In this research, there was no significant difference between the male and female parliamentarians in terms of social dominance orientation (SDO).¹⁴⁶ On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 would indicate a very high level of SDO and 7 very low, the average score was 3.17,¹⁴⁷ indicating that on average MPs exhibit an average to high level of SDO. However, SDO was not significantly related to any of the variables regarding beliefs about corruption or exposure to corruption.

3.3 Gendered Networks and Opportunities for Corruption

3.3a Existing Research

Goetz has also asserted that the idea that women tend to be less corrupt than men is a “myth,” and that the causal relationship between women’s participation and corruption is unclear.¹⁴⁸ Goetz attempts to assert that evidence of women’s lack of corruption is anecdotal to support her argument. She asserts that the issue with the Swamy et al. and Dollar et al. studies is that there is no consistent or accurate measure or definition of corruption, and that the studies are based on how gender shapes people’s reactions to corruption, rather than how gender relations condition the opportunities for corrupt or opportunistic behavior. Though far from disproving other hypotheses regarding gender and corruption, Goetz makes important contributions in terms of how gender may shape opportunities for corruptions, and in expanding the discussion of gender and corruption to address gendered networks.

Goetz asserts that arrangements for the inclusion of women in politics that ignore differences in race, class, and ethnicity between women lead to elite women capturing public office.¹⁴⁹ Instead, Goetz posits that opportunities for corruption are shaped by gender. Through this lens, women are relatively new to public office, and their recruitment to and treatment within politics and public administration differ from the experiences of men.¹⁵⁰ In the context of South Asia, Goetz addresses the tendency to recruit women to political parties based on dynastic leadership, caste, family, and patronage systems, thus undermining the ability of most women to participate. Furthermore, this lateral mode of recruitment entails that the women who can participate often lack experience in political alliance building, debate, long-term strategy, campaign resource generation, and policy development. With these limitations, women who are recruited have restricted opportunities for engaging in corruption, deriving from their relative exclusion from male patronage networks and sexual risk involved with their participation.¹⁵¹ Goetz contributes a number of important questions to consider in examining the link between gender and corruption. Are women asked for bribes less often than men because they are believed to have less money? Or do women, as home-managers, face different types of corruption and at different levels than men working in the formal economy? Is the ‘currency’ of corruption sometimes harassment or sexual abuse?¹⁵²

Sundstrom similarly discusses gendered networks as a more deeply complicating factor in assessing the link. Similar to Goetz, he asserts the recruitment process as a focal point of gender-differentiated experience, but asserts that process is two-fold, first in candidate recruitment then during representation in elected seats.¹⁵³ Sundstrom advances two processes—“hindered by networks” and “clean from networks.” “Hindered by networks” is a process in which women are excluded from candidate selection because of gendered networks; the causal direction is from corruption to gender. “Clean from networks” is a process in which women who are actually elected are newcomers and are not involved in male-dominated corrupt networks, and thus are less likely to have opportunities and engage in corrupt practices; in this instance the causal direction is from gender to corruption. Sundstrom does not advance this framework as an explanation on its own, but rather a complementary framework for assessing the question at hand regarding corruption and gender.¹⁵⁴ Importantly, in this framework, the two processes are not mutually exclusive, and can

149 Ibid.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid.

152 Ibid.

153 Aksel Sundstrom, “Understanding gendered networks and corruption: A two-dimensional process during recruitment and representation,” Paper to be presented for the Workshop on Gender and Politics at the Women and Politics Specialist Group of the Political Studies Association, London, 26 February 2011.

154 Ibid.

145 Sidanius, Levin, Liu, and Pratto, “Social dominance orientation, anti-egalitarianism and the political psychology of gender: an extension and cross-cultural replication,” 2000.

146 $t(80)=.743, p>.05$

147 $N=82, M=3.17, SD=.65$

148 Anne Marie Goetz, “Political Cleaners: Women as the New Anti-Corruption Force?” *Development and Change* 38, no. 1, 2007: 87-105.

actually coexist, thus introducing the idea that the causal direction can actually go both ways.¹⁵⁵

Dahlerup and Leyenaar have developed a multidimensional model of male dominance and gender balance in politics. According to this model, there are six different dimensions in which male dominance is asserted—in representation, the political workplace, the distribution of positions in political hierarchies, access to portfolios and committees, discourses and framing, and public policy. Importantly, they distinguish between real transformation and cosmetic changes, which are actually only new forms of male dominance. They acknowledge that in older Western democracies it took about 100 years to reach 20-40% representation of women in parliaments, whereas in many new democracies and post-conflict countries, comparable percentages were reached in a relatively short period with the implementation of legal gender quotas.¹⁵⁶ With this, they conclude that further research is needed to compare the two trajectories, which should address: the robustness of women's political representation ahead of meaningful socioeconomic and educational change; perceptions of women as politicians; portfolio; policy change and women leaders' capacity in fast-track methods; the relative assimilation or transformation from female politicians in each trajectory.¹⁵⁷

Bjarnegard similarly proposes that gendered networks explain the relationship between gender and corruption, but that the causal relationship may actually be the reverse of that asserted in other research, where political corruption benefits those with access to networks, connections within the local or national elite, resources to finance corrupt behavior, and who are already influential in society—usually men. The study finds that the level of corruption in a country tends to influence the composition of the parliament, rather than the other way around. However, this relationship was less significant when controlling for the interaction effect between democracy and corruption, suggesting the relationship is more complex. Bjarnegard does conclude that while there are many remaining questions regarding this theory, it may be the case that corruption often takes the form of nepotism, which may benefit elite groups already in power, many of which are predominated by men.¹⁵⁸

In her doctoral thesis, Bjarnegard also advances the concept of homosocial capital, which is also drawn upon by Sundstrom and differs from other claims about gendered networks in that it specifies the mechanisms that motivate and facilitate men's accumulation of political capital that is needed for electoral success, but also is not accessible

155 Ibid.

156 Drude Dahlerup and Monique Leyenaar, « The Move towards Gender Balance in Politics—in old and new democracies, » Paper to be presented at the 3rd European Conference on Politics and Gender, Barcelona, 21-23 March 2013.

157 Ibid.

158 Elin Bjarnegard, "Gendered Consequences of a Corrupt Road to Political Office," Paper to be presented at the 20th IPSA World Congress, July 9-13, 2006, Fukuoka, Japan.

for women.¹⁵⁹ This concept further adds to Sundstrom's conceptualization of the causal direction regarding gender and corruption as two-way, where the exclusion of women from gendered networks is a critical underpinning of the relationship between gender and corruption.¹⁶⁰

Folke and Rickne expand the gendered networks framework to include larger dimensions of social gender inequality, such a women's perceived family responsibilities. Examining Swedish municipal politicians, this study found that women are considerably less likely to be reelected, and a negative bias against women prevails among party selectors when meritocracy is not enforced. In their research, supply factors, primarily family responsibilities, explained some of the gap between men and women in influential appointments, but demand factors such as experience, age, education, and income did not.¹⁶¹ This research advances the gendered network framework beyond the recruitment and representation processes, and into political careers, appointments, and gender gap in political influence. Furthermore, the fact that this study was undertaken in Sweden is quite telling for how gendered networks contribute to disadvantage for women in politics while also accounting for social institutions and social gender inequality.¹⁶²

Similarly, Inamasu and Ikeda draw on social capital as well as the Position Generator to examine the effect of gendered social capital on political participation. Controlling for demographic variables such as gender, age, education, and geographic location, as well as political interest and knowledge, the study found that there is a gender-biased distribution of social capital, where only the male networks had a positive effect on electoral participation. They concluded that it is more difficult for women to participate in politics because their political interpersonal networks are weaker than men's. However, they also found that female or nonpolitical networks promote governmental participation, which encompasses less direct activities such as contacting local influential politicians, participating in civic movements, signing a petition, or making a donation.¹⁶³

Alhasaan-Aloho draws on Differential Association and Opportunity theory (DAO) and Social Role theory in asserting that the argument that women are less corrupt will not hold true if corrupt opportunities and networks exist, based on empirical evidence from Ghana.¹⁶⁴ DAO theory advances the

159 Aksel Sundstrom, "Understanding gendered networks and corruption," 2011.

160 Ibid.

161 Olle Folke and Johanna Rickne, "Female Representation but Male Rule? Party Competition and the Political Glass Ceiling," Research Institute for Industrial Economics, IFN Working Paper No. 923, 2012.

162 Ibid.

163 Kazunori Inamasu and Ken'ichi Ikeda, "The effect of gendered social capital on political participation: Using the Position Generator method on the JES3 Dataset," Paper prepared for a conference on social capital, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, 29-30 May 2008.

164 Namawu Alhasaan-Aloho, "Gender and Corruption: Testing the New Consensus," Public Administration and Development 27, 2007: 227-237.

idea that people who commit crimes not only have frequent interactions with people who condone such behavior, but also have the opportunity to partake in it, explaining how individuals come to engage in illegal behavior. Social Role theory posits that an individual's behavior is influenced by their understanding of appropriate behavior for someone occupying their position, their perceptions of expectations that others hold for them in their role, and their perceived role pressures and fear of sanctions if those expectations are deviated from.¹⁶⁵ Within this framework, Alhassan-Aloho's study concludes that females did not exude higher ethical standards than men, and may not necessarily prove less corrupt than men when exposed to opportunities and networks for corruption. The study similarly found no gender difference in using public positions to fulfill kinship or societal obligations.¹⁶⁶ Fundamentally, he concludes that corruption does not depend on gender, but rather opportunities and networks for corruption, which can be gendered, in which case one gender may have less engagement in corrupt activities, or gender neutral, in which case the gender of the official would not make any difference regarding corruption. Alhassan-Aloho particularly warns against the advancement of women as an anti-corruption tool, anticipating that its failure could undermine efforts at gender mainstreaming on the basis of equality.¹⁶⁷

3.3b Findings

Female MPs were more likely than male MPs to feel that their gender is a disadvantage for their political career.¹⁶⁸ Whereas 44% of female MPs agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed with this statement, only 10% of male MPs felt the same. The belief that one's gender is a disadvantage to one's political career was associated with the belief that under certain circumstances, it is sometimes okay to take a bribe.¹⁶⁹

Family and Business Networks

While there was no significant difference between male and female MPs regarding their perception of their family as powerful and important,¹⁷⁰ male MPs were significantly more likely to report that their family is politically active.¹⁷¹ 68% of respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that their family is powerful and important. Only 16% disagreed or strongly disagreed. Whereas 70% of male MPs agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that their family is

politically active, only 38% of female MPs said the same. However, there was no significant difference between men and women in reporting that they often socialize with powerful people.¹⁷² 68% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they often socialize with powerful people, with 24% disagreeing, somewhat, or strongly disagreeing.

Interestingly, women were more likely than men to report that their family supports them being a Member of Parliament.¹⁷³ Whereas 85% of female MPs strongly agreed that their family supports them, only 56% of male MPs reported the same. The remaining 15% of female MPs agreed with the statement, and 42% of the remaining male MPs agreed or somewhat agreed. There was no significant difference between male and female MPs in reporting that their family relies on the income they earn as an MP.¹⁷⁴ 44% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that their family relies on their income.

There were a number of relationships between variables related to family status and support and corruption. Reporting having family support as an MP was associated with being approached to ask for favors,¹⁷⁵ and with people doing favors for the respondent or members of their family.¹⁷⁶ Reporting that the family relies on income as an MP was associated with people approaching the respondent to offer bribes or compensation for favors.¹⁷⁷ Reporting that one's family was powerful and important was related to reporting that people often do favors for them or members of their family,¹⁷⁸ approach them to offer bribes or compensation for favors,¹⁷⁹ and with the belief that it is normal for MPs to use their position to do favors for people.¹⁸⁰ Reporting that one's family is not very politically active was not significantly related to any of the variables measure beliefs about or exposure to corruption. Reporting often socializing with powerful people was also related to reporting that people often approach them to ask for favors,¹⁸¹ and that people often do favors for them or members of their family.¹⁸²

Male MPs were significantly more likely to report that they feel they are good at conducting business.¹⁸³ Whereas 54% of male MPs felt they are good at conducting business, only 32% of female MPs responded positively. However, there was no significant difference between men and women regarding their perception that as an MP, they represent

165 Ibid.
 166 Ibid.
 167 Ibid.
 168 $t(49)=2.93, p<.01$ (Male MPs $N=61, M=5.62, SD=1.69$; Female MPs $N=32, M=4.28, SD=2.29$)
 169 $r(93)=.252, p<.05$
 170 $t(95)=.982, p>.05$
 171 $t(50)=3.97, p<.005$ (Male MPs $N=71, M=5.03, SD=1.66$; Female MPs $N=32, M=3.41, SD=2.03$)

172 $t(48)=.178, p>.05$
 173 $t(102)=3.54, p<.01$ (Male MPs $N=71, M=1.56, SD=.82$; Female MPs $N=33, M=1.15, SD=.36$)
 174 $t(103)=1.77, p>.05$
 175 $r(104)=.272, p<.01$
 176 $r(100)=.305, p<.01$
 177 $r(103)=.276, p<.01$
 178 $rs(95)=.259, p<.05$
 179 $rs(96)=.207, p<.05$
 180 $rs(94)=.206, p<.05$
 181 $rs(102)=.195, p<.05$
 182 $r(99)=.287, p<.01$
 183 $t(98)=3.29, p<.01$ (Male MPs $N=69, M=3.72, SD=1.82$; Female MPs $N=31, M=5.06, SD=2.02$)

the interests of people who are active in business and the Afghan economy.¹⁸⁴ 68% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed with this statement, whereas 22% disagreed, somewhat or strongly disagreed. There was no significant difference between male and female MPs in reporting that they had personally communicated with prominent business officials within the past two months,¹⁸⁵ which 22% of respondents reported to have done.

There was no significant difference between male and female MPs in the belief that it is important to know powerful and important people.¹⁸⁶ 63% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed with this statement, with only 8% strongly disagreeing. There was also no significant difference between male and female MPs in reporting having had the opportunity to travel outside of Afghanistan as an MP.¹⁸⁷ 78% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly disagreed with this statement.

The perception that one is good at conducting business was related to reporting that people often do favors for the respondent or members of their family.¹⁸⁸ Similar to other variables related to business networks, the belief that as an MP one represents the interests of people in business and the Afghan economy was related to reporting that people often approach the respondent to ask for favors,¹⁸⁹ and that people often do favors for the respondent or members of their family.¹⁹⁰ This belief that it is important to know powerful and important people was positively associated with the belief that it is normal for MPs to use their position to do favors for people.¹⁹¹ Reporting having had the opportunity to travel was positively associated with the belief that it is possible to be successful in government or politics in Afghanistan without doing corrupt things,¹⁹² but it was also positively associated with the belief that it is normal for MPs to use their position to do favors for people.¹⁹³

Pre-Parliamentary Networks

Male MPs were significantly more likely than female MPs to report that they knew many powerful and important people before becoming an MP.¹⁹⁴ Whereas 64% of male MPs agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they knew many powerful people before becoming an MP, only 45% of female MPs said the same. Reporting knowing many powerful people prior to becoming an MP was related to

184 t(97)=.926, p>.05
 185 X2(1, 96)=1.86, p>.05
 186 t(101)=-.131, p>.05
 187 t(46)=.277, p>.05
 188 rs(98)=.289, p<.01
 189 rs(99)=.198, p<.05
 190 rs(97)=.288, p<.01
 191 rs(100)=.202, p<.05
 192 rs(97)=.204, p<.05
 193 rs(100)=.288, p<.01
 194 t(99)=2.13, p<.05

reporting that people often do favors for the respondent and their family.¹⁹⁵ Interestingly, it was also positively associated with the belief that it is possible to be successful in government or politics in Afghanistan without doing corrupt things.¹⁹⁶

However, differences were not significant between male and female MPs in reporting that people approached them for favors prior to becoming an MP,¹⁹⁷ that they knew they would win when they ran for parliament,¹⁹⁸ that there were people who did not support them running for office,¹⁹⁹ or that they were able to become an MP because powerful or wealthy people supported them.²⁰⁰ 98% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that before they became an MP, people would often approach them to ask for favors. 90% agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they knew they would win when they decided to run for parliament, and 74% that there were many who did not support them running for office. However, only 16% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they were able to become a Member of Parliament because powerful or wealthy people supported them.

Reporting that they were approached for favors prior to becoming an MP was strongly associated with reporting that people currently often approach the respondent to ask for favors,²⁰¹ and that people often do favors for the respondent or members of their family.²⁰² Similarly, reporting knowing that they would win when they ran for parliament was also associated with reporting that people often approach the respondent to ask for favors,²⁰³ and that people often do favors for the respondent or members of their family.²⁰⁴ Reporting that they were able to become an MP because powerful or wealthy people supported them was associated with reporting that people often approach the respondent to offer bribes or compensation for favors.²⁰⁵ Similarly, reporting that there were many who did not support them in running for office, indicating a potential lack of access to powerful networks, was inversely related to reporting that people often approach the respondent to ask for favors.²⁰⁶

Parliamentary Networks

While there was no significant difference between male and female MPs regarding socializing with other female

195 rs(99)=.223, p<.05
 196 rs(96)=.206, p<.05
 197
 198
 199
 200
 201 rs(105)=.439, p<.001
 202 rs(101)=.275, p<.01
 203 rs(105)=.393, p<.001
 204 rs(101)=.277, p<.01
 205 rs(101)=.339, p<.01
 206 rs(101)=-.297, p<.01

MPs,²⁰⁷ men were significantly more likely than women to report that they often socialize with other male MPs.²⁰⁸ 83% of male MPs and 91% of female MPs agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they often socialize with other female MPs. However, while 100% of male MPs agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they often socialize with other male MPs, only 84% of female MPs responded the same. Additionally, 51% of male MPs strongly agreed with the statement regarding socializing with other male MPs, whereas only 38% of women strongly agreed. While this was approximately the same as the number of female MPs who strongly agreed that they regularly socialize with other female MPs (39%), it was much higher than the 20% of men who strongly agreed that they often socialize with other female MPs. Male MPs were significantly more likely to report having personally communicated with another male MP within the past two months (90% of male MP respondents versus 65% of female MPs).²⁰⁹ Similarly, female MPs were significantly more likely to report having personally communicated with another female MP within the past two months (90% of female MP respondents versus 68% of male MPs).²¹⁰

Reporting often socializing with other female MPs was related to reporting often being approached by people to ask for favors,²¹¹ as was socializing with other male MPs.²¹² Socializing with other male MPs was also associated with reporting that people often do favors for the respondent or members of their family,²¹³ and was inversely related to the belief that under certain circumstances, it is sometimes okay to take a bribe.²¹⁴

However, there were not significant differences between male and female MPs regarding whether they discuss issues with other MPs first when making decisions in parliament,²¹⁵ or reporting that other MPs consult them before making decisions in parliament.²¹⁶ 84% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed that they discuss issues with other MPs before making decisions, and 79% the same regarding others consulting them when making decisions. Reporting consulting other MPs before making decisions in parliament was related to reporting that people often do favors for the respondent and members of their family,²¹⁷ and was strongly associated with the belief that it is normal

for MPs to use their position to do favors for people.²¹⁸ Reporting that others consult them before making decisions in parliament was related to the same variables, associated with people doing favors for the respondent or members of their family,²¹⁹ and the belief that it is normal for MPs to use their position to do favors for people.²²⁰

Political Networks and Political Parties

There was no significant difference between male and female MPs in reporting that they had communicated with a Minister within the past two months.²²¹ 50% of all respondents reported having done so. Similarly, there was no significant difference between male and female MPs in reporting that they had personally communicated with the President of Afghanistan within the past two months,²²² which 40% of respondents reported to have done.

There was no significant difference between male and female MPs in reporting that they were an active member of a political party.²²³ Only 17% of all respondents strongly agreed with this statement, while 20% agreed or somewhat agreed, and 50% neither agreed nor disagreed, disagreed, somewhat or strongly disagreed. There was also no significant difference between male and female MPs in the belief that it is more important to know powerful people than to be part of a powerful political party.²²⁴ 36% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed with this statement, and 19% neither agreed nor disagreed. Only 11% of respondents strongly disagreed with this statement. There was no significant difference between male and female MPs in reporting having personally communicated with top-level party officials within the past two months,²²⁵ which 52% of respondents reported having done.

Reporting being active in a political party was associated with reporting that people often do favors for them or their family.²²⁶ The belief that it is more important to know powerful people than to be part of a powerful political party was also associated with reporting that people often do favors for them or for their family,²²⁷ and with the belief that it is normal for MPs to use their position to do favors for other people.²²⁸

207 $t(96)=1.84, p>.05$

208 $t(36)=2.98, p>.01$ (Male MPs $N=72, M=1.56, SD=.63$; Female MPs $N=32, M=2.38, SD=1.50$)

209 $X^2(1, 100)=9.31, p<.01$

210 $X^2(1, 97)=5.15, p<.05$

211 $rs(98)=-.310, p<.01$

212 $rs(104)=-.270, p<.01$

213 $rs(101)=-.212, p<.05$

214 $rs(103)=-.199, p<.05$

215 $t(101)=-.044, p>.05$

216 $t(102)=1.73, p>.05$

217 $rs(100)=-.314, p<.01$

218 $rs(101)=-.400, p<.001$

219 $rs(100)=-.363, p<.001$

220 $rs(102)=-.305, p<.01$

221 $X^2(1, 101)=.130, p>.05$

222 $X^2(1, 97)=1.20, p>.05$

223 $t(87)=1.78, p>.05$

224 $t(97)=-.523, p>.05$

225 $X^2(1, 100)=3.18, p>.05$

226 $rs(88)=-.259, p<.05$

227 $rs(96)=-.241, p<.05$

228 $rs(97)=-.326, p<.01$

3.4 Liberal Democracy

3.4a Existing Research

There is a considerable body of research positing that observed differences in national corruption are not due to gendered behavioral differences, but rather that the relationship between corruption and gender is a reflection of the institutional context and government system. Hung-En Sung offers an alternative argument to what is deemed as the “fairer sex” argument, and considers the “fairer system” argument, positing that the correlation between gender and corruption is spurious, where a fairer system—namely, a liberal democratic polity—facilitates a more participatory social structure and also encourages lower levels of corruption. The study concluded that although female participation in government did correlate to lower levels of corruption under some circumstances, the association lost significance when the effects of constitutional liberalism were appropriately controlled for. It found that the role of the judiciary and the press are of considerable importance, corresponding with their potential to either condone or restrict corruption. Sung concludes that rather than gender equality being responsible for lower corruption, gender equality and government accountability are “both great achievements of modern liberal democracy.”²²⁹

Esarey and Chirillo similarly conclude that women are not necessarily more intrinsically honest or averse to corruption than men, based on a number of studies, many of which are reviewed in this desk study. Instead, they assert that democratic institutions activate the relationship between gender and corruption by making corruption a risky activity by shrinking the potential profit, increasing the probability of discovery, and morally stigmatizing the perpetrators. They posit that these risks are smaller in autocratic states where bribery and favoritism are often normal transactions, and not being corrupt may actually be riskier than corruption. In this context, they argue that women are differentially impacted by these risks and consequently experience greater pressure to conform to existing political norms regarding corruption.²³⁰

Esarey and Chirillo’s study focuses on institutionalized democracy/autocracy measures as indicators of the social, political, and financial stigmatization of corruption, based on the belief that some institutions associated with democracy on average tend to publicize, disincentivize, and facilitate condemnation of the private use of power at public expense.²³¹ In this context, examining 157 countries from 1998 to 2007, Esarey and Chirillo find that female

229 Hung-En Sung, “Fairer Sex or Fairer System? Gender and Corruption Revisited,” *Social Forces* 82, no. 2, 2003.

230 Justin Esarey and Gina Chirillo, “‘Fairer Sex’ or Purity Myth? Corruption, Gender, and Institutional Context,” *Politics and Gender* 9, no. 4, 2013: 390-413.

231 Ibid.

participation in government is unrelated to corruption in autocracies, but is negatively related to corruption in democracies. They find that in states with a low Polity score (from the Polity IV Project on a scale where -10 is strongly autocratic and 10 is strongly democratic), there is actually a small but statistically significant negative relationship between the percentage of women in parliament and the control of corruption. Conversely, in states with a high Polity score, they found a strong, statistically significant and positive relationship between the percentage of women in parliament and corruption. They hypothesize that it may be that in societies where women are relatively disempowered, they may have a greater incentive to conform to the expectations of the political culture, actually making women more willing to participate in corruption than men. They check their findings with a number of different measures for democracy and corruption, and conclude that women are more averse to the risks of violating political norms, and that where corruption is stigmatized, women will be less tolerant of corruption and less likely to engage in corruption compared to men. However, if corrupt behaviors are an ordinary party of governance supported by political institutions, it can be expected that there will be no gender gap in corruption. They acknowledge that there may be other causal mechanisms that make this link spurious, such as degree of institutionalized gender discrimination or access to personal networks and opportunities for corruption, but largely attribute their findings to democratic institutions.²³²

However, there is a considerable limitation to the liberal democracy argument in that many of the liberal democracies that are considered to be well-established do not have gender parity in political representation, or even close to it in some cases. While Cuba has 49% of its national parliament seats held by women, the United States has only 18%, the United Kingdom 23%, and Germany 37%. The level of representation of women in the US legislature is equivalent to women’s representation in the national body of the United Arab Emirates.²³³ These anomalies suggest that though a relationship has been found between democratic institutions and both lower corruption and higher women’s representation, democracy alone does not provide a complete explanation.

3.5b Liberal Democracy in the Afghan Context

Women’s Political Representation

Afghanistan ranks 42nd out of 143 countries in the Inter-Parliamentarian Union database in terms of percentage of women in parliament, with 27.7% women in the lower

232 Ibid.

233 “Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments,” The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc

house and 17.6% in the upper house. Afghanistan ranks 70th out of 94 countries in terms of proportion of women among ministerial positions, with 10% of ministerial positions held by women in data reflecting appointments up to 1 January 2015.²³⁴

Rule of Law, Freedom of Press, and Democratic Elections

According to Freedom House indicators in 2015, Afghanistan received a score of 2/16 on Rule of Law, with a judicial system that “operates haphazardly, and justice in many places (...) administered on the basis of a mixture of legal codes by inadequately trained judges.”²³⁵ The explanation continues that the “Supreme Court, composed of religious scholars who have little knowledge of civil jurisprudence, is particularly in need of reform,” and “Corruption in the judiciary is extensive.”²³⁶ It also acknowledges a “prevailing climate of impunity.”²³⁷ Additionally, Afghanistan’s score in the area of Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights was low, at 2/16. The explanation of the score cited displacement, inability to protect property rights, involvement of criminal groups in private business activity, women’s rights, and human rights violations. It explained “Although women have formal rights to education and employment, and some participate in public life, discrimination and domestic violence remain pervasive (...) Women’s choices regarding marriage and divorce remain circumscribed by custom and discriminatory laws” and “The forced marriage of young girls to older men or widows to their husbands’ male relations is a problem.”²³⁸

Afghanistan scored low regarding Freedom of Expression and Beliefs, with a score of 5/16. The discussion of the score explained “Despite a 2007 media law intended to clarify press freedoms and limit government interference, a growing number of journalists have been arrested, threatened, or harassed by politicians, security services, and others in positions of power.”²³⁹

Afghanistan also received low scores regarding political rights (11/40), electoral process (3/12), political pluralism and participation (6/16), and functioning of government (2/12). The explanations cited the low voter turnout and widespread fraud, as well as delays in political transitions in the 2010 parliamentary elections and the 2014 presidential and provincial council elections. It also cited Afghanistan’s single nontransferable vote electoral system, weak political parties, and the impacts of violence and

insecurity on political activity. Regarding the functioning of government, the delays in assembling a cabinet in the Ghani administration, as well as “corruption, nepotism, and cronyism remain[ing] rampant at all levels of government, and inadequate salaries [that] exacerbate corrupt behaviors by public employees.”²⁴⁰

Afghanistan is not currently scored in the Polity IV Index, which was utilized in the Esarey and Chirillo study, currently coded score -66, which indicates a case of foreign “interruption.”²⁴¹ In this study, there was no difference between male and female MPs in the perception that parliamentary elections in Afghanistan are open, fair, and uncorrupt. Only 16% of all respondents agreed, somewhat or strongly agreed with this statement. 58% disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement.

Socioeconomic Development

Afghanistan ranked 24th lowest in terms of GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2014 at USD 1,960.²⁴² 36% of Afghanistan’s population was living below the poverty line in 2011, 16th highest among those ranked in 2011. Only 32% of Afghanistan’s population over the age of 15 was literate in 2011, the lowest of all countries in the world with scores in the World Bank database in 2011.²⁴³

Normalization of Corruption in Political Institutions

It would be difficult to assert that corrupt behaviors are not an ordinary part of governance supported by political institutions in Afghanistan. In the 2014 National Corruption Survey, 36% of Afghans ranked corruption as the biggest problem in Afghanistan, only after insecurity, and 21% of respondents had faced corruption within the last 12 months.²⁴⁴ The report also noted a further increase in the institutionalization of corruption, with corruption plaguing access to key public services such as electricity, higher education, justice and the police. The most common type of corruption that respondents reported in the current political system in Afghanistan was ethnic, personal, family and party relations—reported by 57% of respondents.

Additionally, Afghanistan ranked 172 out of 175 countries in 2014 on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index with a score of 12 out of 100.²⁴⁵

234 “Women in Politics: 2015,” Inter-Parliamentarian Union, 2015, http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/wmnmap15_en.pdf.

235 “Afghanistan: Freedom in the World 2015,” Freedom House, 2015, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/afghanistan>.

236 Ibid.

237 Ibid.

238 Ibid.

239 Ibid.

240 Ibid.

241 “Polity IV Country Report 2010: Afghanistan,” Systemic Peace, 2010, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Afghanistan2010.pdf>.

242 “Data,” The World Bank, 2015, <http://data.worldbank.org/?display=default>.

243

244 Mohammad Razaq Isaqzadeh and Shahim Ahmad Kabuli, “Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: National Corruption Survey 2014,” Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2014, http://www.baag.org.uk/sites/www.baag.org.uk/files/resources/attachments/IWA%20national_corruption_survey_2014_english.pdf.

245 “Corruption By Country: Afghanistan,” Transparency International, 2015, <http://www.baag.org.uk/sites/www.baag.org.uk/files/resources/attachments/IWA%20>

Afghanistan received a score of -1.621 in terms of Control of Corruption in 2010, a 1% percentile rank.²⁴⁶ On a scale from 1 to 5 (1 being not at all corrupt and 5 extremely corrupt) on the 2013 Corruption Barometer, political parties received a score of 2.9, and parliament and the legislature a score of 3.2, only 0.2 points lower than the judiciary—the institution perceived to be most affected by corruption.²⁴⁷

3.5 Social Institutions

3.5a Existing Research

The role of social institutions has been another factor asserted as underlying the observed correlation between gender and corruption. Inglehart, Norris and Welzel examined the impact of economic and cultural variables on the proportion of women in parliament and on a society's level of democracy, and found that relative gender equality in parliament is closely linked with democracy, but neither variable seemed to cause the other. Rather, they found that both variables seemed to reflect an underlying cultural shift linked to economic development. According to their arguments, this shift in economic development and cultural heritage contributes to a shift from survival toward self-expression values that facilitates both democratic institutions and a higher percentage of women in parliament.²⁴⁸

Drawing on these findings, Branisa and Ziegler explore the effect of discrimination against women on corruption in society. They base their study on the idea that society's attitude towards women influences how the political system functions and the positions women take within it; therefore, if the level of corruption depends on the functioning of the political system, a society's attitude toward gender has an impact on levels of corruption. Branisa and Ziegler's study, using data from the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), concluded that after controlling for representation of women in political and economic life and for democracy, the Civil liberties subindex has a robust negative and significant effect on corruption. Essentially, in countries where social institutions inhibit women's freedom to participate in social life, corruption is higher.²⁴⁹

national_corruption_survey_2014_english.pdf.

246 Ibid.

247 Ibid.

248 Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris, and Christian Welzel, "Gender Equality and Democracy," *Comparative Sociology* 1, no. 3/4, 2002: 321-346.

249 Boris Branisa and Maria Ziegler, "Reexamining the link between gender and corruption: The role of social institutions," *Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin, 2011*, no. 15.

3.5b Social Institutions in the Afghan Context

Social Institutions and Gender

The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) utilizes a broad spectrum of data to evaluate the discriminatory nature of social institutions in terms of formal and informal laws, attitudes and practices that restrict women's and girls' access to rights, justice and empowerment.²⁵⁰ Afghanistan was classified as high in terms of discrimination in social institutions on the SIGI in 2014, with a value of 0.3224.²⁵¹ Afghanistan was classified as very high in terms of discriminatory family code, high in terms of restricted physical integrity, very high in terms of son bias, high in terms of restricted resources and assets, and medium regarding restricted civil liberties.²⁵²

Research regarding social institutions as an explanatory factor regarding the relationship between gender and corruption utilized the civil liberties subindex. Afghanistan's score regarding women's access to public space was 1, political quotas 0, and political participation 0.28.²⁵³ The explanation of the score cited social custom that continues to limit women's freedom of movement, as well as threats against women who are active in the public sphere and legal reforms such as the Shiite Personal Status Law. It also discussed women's political voice, citing the constitutionally mandated quota, but the limiting factor of traditional social practices on women's participation in politics and activities outside the home and continued threats and violence towards women active in public life.²⁵⁴

Social Attitudes Regarding Women in Politics

Though data is limited, there are some indications of attitudes towards women in politics in Afghanistan. In 2014, 56% of respondents in the national Survey of the Afghan People felt that women should decide for themselves on how to vote, though 17% felt that men should decide for them and 26% that they should decide for themselves but in consultation with men.²⁵⁵ 30% of respondents felt that women should not be allowed to work outside the home, and 70% strongly or somewhat agreed that it is acceptable **for women to work in government offices.**²⁵⁶ Whereas 60%

250 "About the SIGI," OECD, 2015, <http://www.genderindex.org/content/team>.

251 "Afghanistan" Social Institutions and Gender Index, OECD, 2015, <http://www.genderindex.org/country/afghanistan>.

252 Ibid.

253 Ibid.

254 Ibid.

255 Zach Warren, "Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People," The Asia Foundation, 2014, <https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2014final.pdf>.

256 Ibid.

of men felt that they have influence over local government decisions in 2014, only 52% of women felt the same.²⁵⁷ Women were significantly more likely than men to report that they would have fear voting in a national or provincial election,²⁵⁸ and running for office.²⁵⁹

Most tellingly, only 38% of Afghans felt that elected government positions should be equal for both men and women, though 12% felt they should be mostly for women. Differences were significant between men's and women's perceptions,²⁶⁰ where 62% of men felt that political positions should be mostly for men, compared to 36% of women. 48% of women felt that they should be equal for both men and women, compared to 29% of men.

257 Ibid.

258 $\chi^2(4, 9271)=479.24, p<.001$

259 $\chi^2(4, 9271)=14.28, p<.01$

260 $\chi^2(4, 9271)=596.285, p<.001$

4. Conclusion

This research sought to answer the question of why the relationship between women in legislature and corruption, which has been shown to be consistent cross-nationally and in a range of contexts, appears nonexistent in Afghanistan. It examined four key categories of explanations for this relationship observed in other contexts—namely behavioral differences, gendered networks, liberal democracy, and social institutions, based on over a decade of research on the subject in a variety of contexts. Research has attributed the correlation between corruption and gender to behavioral differences between men and women. Others have asserted that women are for the most part relatively new to politics, and have less access to networks that provide opportunities for corrupt behavior. An alternative explanation is the ‘fairer sex’ versus ‘fairer system’ theory, which asserts that an association between gender and corruption is spurious and mainly caused by its context, liberal democracy, which in theory would promote both gender equality and better governance. Lastly other research has asserted that corruption is higher in countries where social institutions deprive women of their freedom to participate in social life. These findings would suggest that, in a context where social values disadvantage women, neither political reforms towards democracy nor increasing the representation of women in political and economic positions might be enough to reduce corruption.

This research found no evidence to support that male or female MPs in Afghanistan have more or less exposure to or beliefs regarding acceptability of corruption. Additionally, the research found that male and female MPs are generally perceived as equally corrupt by their peers, which would support the general public perception that the parliament is somewhat corrupt. According to the findings of this research, regardless of gender, though most MPs self-report being opposed to bribe-taking, using one’s position to do favors for others and accepting favors is common among all MPs, and all MPs in Afghanistan can be considered to be highly exposed to corruption.

Evidence found in this research supports the hypotheses that higher levels of corruption are related to higher levels of impulsivity, higher levels of selfishness, and higher levels of materialism. Interestingly, gender differences in personality traits were expected to be a major finding in this study, and relatively few gender differences emerged. This challenges the idea that gender differences in personality traits contribute to engagement in and exposure to corruption in

Afghanistan, and would generally oppose the “fairer sex” explanation regarding observed relationships between gender and corruption found in other research, such as the Dollar et al. and Torgler and Valey studies reviewed. This would suggest that it is not likely that women (at least those who reach the level of political success to become MPs) in Afghanistan are inherently less corrupt or have intrinsic personality traits that make them less likely to support or engage in corruption.

That this research found no evidence of differences in exposure to and beliefs regarding corruption between male and female MPs triangulates with the findings that there appears to be little to no difference between male and female MPs regarding access to networks that would facilitate opportunities for corruption. It is possible that given the nature of politics and patronage networks in Afghanistan, any politician who successful becomes a member of parliament likely has access to networks and the support of powerful individuals regardless of their gender. Additionally, contrary to the findings of other research, this research found no difference between male and female MPs regarding their involvement in political parties, which can likely be explained by the weak nature of the party system in Afghanistan.

In the context of the earlier reviewed studies from Hung-En Sung and from Esarey and Chirillo, these indicators of liberal democracy provide a compelling case for looking at the seemingly absent relationship between women in government and corruption in Afghanistan. Hung-En Sung’s study found that the role of the judiciary and the press are of considerable importance, corresponding with their potential to either condone or restrict corruption. Afghanistan is widely known to have a corrupt and low-functioning judiciary, with the courts viewed as the most corrupt public institution in Afghanistan.²⁶¹ Additionally, though it has been acknowledged that though the media landscape in Afghanistan is increasingly open and rapidly developing,²⁶² Afghanistan still has a long way to go in terms of the freedom and role of the press. Human Rights Watch recently released a report titled “Stop Reporting or We’ll Kill Your Family: Threats to Media Freedom in Afghanistan,” which documented not only the rising number of attacks and threats against journalists in Afghanistan, but also the Afghan government’s failure to investigate and prosecute

261 “National Corruption Survey 2014 – Key Findings,” Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2014, <http://iwaweb.org/key-findings-ncs-2014/>.

262 “Afghanistan: Freedom in the World 2015,” Freedom House, 2015.

these incidents based on interviews with more than 30 journalists, editors, publishers, and media directors in Afghanistan.²⁶³ These indicators, coupled with Afghanistan's low scores on indicators across a wide spectrum of areas related to liberal democracy and particularly in terms of rule of law and media, suggest that Afghanistan falls short in two of the key areas that play a role in curbing corruption, regardless of the gender of those who occupy positions where they are able to engage in high-level corruption.

Similarly, Esarey and Chirillo also concluded that links between women in government and lower levels of corruption varies based on institutional context, hypothesizing that where "corrupt" behaviors are an ordinary part of governance supported by political institutions, there will be no corruption gender gap.²⁶⁴ This research would also provide a seemingly plausible explanation for the apparent lack of relationship between women in politics and corruption in Afghanistan, where corruption is widely institutionalized and ordinary throughout political institutions and the government.

Based on the findings of this research, the authors conclude that the high level of corruption in Afghanistan despite the relatively high level of representation of women in parliament can likely be attributed to the general pervasive nature of corruption in Afghanistan, as well as weak rule of law and media, and a lack of strong social institutions that would both stigmatize corruption and promote gender equality. It could be possible that gender does have an influence on corrupt behaviors, but only to a certain level of institutionalized corruption, after which the mediating influence of gender may be negligent. According to the findings of this research, it seems that all MPs in Afghanistan are generally well connected, have powerful supporters, and are exposed to opportunities for corruption. It is possible in a system as corrupt as Afghanistan's, which also relies heavily on nepotism and patronage networks, anyone who is successful in politics is likely to be exposed to corruption and a part of networks that create opportunities for corruption, regardless of gender.

In light of this analysis, perhaps most convincingly, the findings of this research would seem to fall in line with the framework advanced by Alhassan-Aloho, which draws upon Differential Association and Opportunity theory (DAO) and Social Role theory in advancing that women will not be less corrupt if corrupt opportunities and networks exist, which abound in Afghanistan. Alhassan-Aloho's study found that females did not have higher ethical standards than men, and may not necessarily prove less corrupt than men when exposed to opportunities and networks for corruption. The study similarly found no gender difference in using public

positions to fulfill kinship or societal obligations, a finding that was echoed in this research. The findings of research on Afghanistan would further support Alhassan-Aloho's conclusion that corruption does not depend on gender, but rather is related to opportunities and networks for corruption, which can be gendered or gender neutral, the latter of which appears to be the case in Afghanistan. In a context where opportunities and networks are gender neutral, which this study found Afghanistan to be, the gender of the official would not make any difference regarding corruption, supporting the findings of this research.

This evidence would support the hypothesis asserted by Branisa and Ziegler, which states that in countries where social institutions inhibit women's freedom to participate in social life, corruption is higher, and the framework advanced by Inglehart et al., that a shift in economic development and cultural heritage contributes to a shift from survival toward self-expression values facilitating both democratic institutions and a higher percentage of women in parliament. However, in Afghanistan, the quota system appears to constitute a deceptive proxy indicator of women's political participation. The high percentage of women in parliament would appear to indicate a degree of gender equality and support for women in public life, but it is not necessarily matched by social institutions promoting gender equality or widespread social attitudes in support of women in politics and public life.

The quota system in Afghanistan creates an illusion of women's participation in government that does not necessarily reflect underlying shifts in cultural heritage and economic development that contribute to strong social institutions. Perhaps the relationship between corruption and gender is spurious, as posited by much of the research reviewed, and Afghanistan simply lacks strong institutions—particularly rule of law and a free press—and women's participation in government is not a reflection of true gender equal values in society which have been found to correspond to liberal democracy and more developed social institutions that support women's participation as well as discouraging corruption.

263 Gabriel Dominguez, "Media freedom in Afghanistan increasingly under threat," DW, 21 January 2015, <http://www.dw.com/en/media-freedom-in-afghanistan-increasingly-under-threat/a-18200978>.

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